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Scott Harvey and William W. Hogan
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Beginning in June of 2000, the shock of unexpectedly high prices in the California electricity
market convinced everyone of the need for policies to correct the apparent market failures.  The
public debate and policy discussions have been dominated by a focus on market power as a
principal problem amenable to regulatory solution.  However, design of effective policies to
moderate prices or mitigate their effects depends on the diagnosis of the underlying causes.  High
prices attributable largely to an exercise of market power in electric generation would point to
particular market participants and behaviors that could be targeted for regulatory action.  By
contrast, high prices attributable to bad electricity market design would indicate a need for
changes in the design.  High prices attributable to higher fuel prices, environmental constraints
and capacity shortages, on the other hand, would prompt actions to address the cost of fuel and
environmental limitations and indicate that retail loads should receive the appropriate price
signal for conservation.
Suppliers could affect market prices by strategically withholding some capacity in order to profit
on the capacity actually sold in the market.  But charging high prices during periods of scarcity is
not classified as exercising market power if there is no strategic withholding of supply.
Likewise, refusing to supply without being paid is not an exercise of market power.  Although
the potential for withholding exists for many suppliers, the focus of attention has been on the
exercise of market power by thermal generators in California.
On its face, the experience of extremely high prices suggests that the exercise of market power
could be important.  But at the same time the data show that there have been profound changes in
the California market such that the thermal generators have actually increased their production
more than demand has grown.  If anything, thermal generators that hit annual output limits
produced too much rather than too little in the summer of 2000.  Furthermore, the widespread
impacts of higher electricity prices throughout the western market, both on and off peak,
indicate that if the exercise of market power is important it is occurring to an extent and through
channels unprecedented in this or other electricity markets.  In short, this is a complicated story,
and there is ample room for further investigation of the data and diagnosis of causes.
Examination of the major analyses of the exercise of market power reveals that the estimated
magnitude of the possible strategic withholding of electric generation is small enough to make it
important to verify the simplifying assumptions.  If strategic withholding were large and
pervasive, then the real details of the California electricity market could be ignored.  But it is by
now apparent that the evidence is not clear, and any finding of the presence or absence of
strategic withholding of generation in the California electricity market could turn on the
simplifying assumptions used in the analysis of the data.  For example, annual limits on
production dictate that plants should not run in many hours when prices are higher than direct
incremental costs; hence, examinations of output decisions for individual hours or months are
necessarily incomplete.  The variation in real time conditions is large enough to produceii
significant reductions in output compared to the expectations given day-ahead prices; hence,
with capacity constraints average optimal production is necessarily less than optimal production
at average prices.  Limits on the ramping rate of generation units, start-up costs, minimum load
costs and other operational inflexibilities imply that a dispatch day is not just twenty-four
separate hours and must be analyzed chronologically, recognizing these factors.  And so on.
Accounting for such effects can reverse the implications of the previous evidence.
Unfortunately, the real details are neither simple nor incidental.
It is difficult to conduct a study of market power based solely on publicly available data.  A
fuller analysis would require data available only to the California Independent System Operator,
and has not been done.  Many factors contributed to higher electricity prices in California, and
the market power theme is only, at most, part of the story.  The import of the previous analyses is
not to prove that market power has been exercised in the California electricity market but, rather,
to suggest that it might be important.  The import of the sensitivity analysis here is not to prove
that market power has not been exercised in the electricity market  but, rather, to suggest that it is
unlikely to be the dominant factor and may not even be significant.  With the available data in
the public domain, and the special complications introduced by the California market design, the
margin of error in estimating the extent of the possible exercise of market power through
strategic withholding of electric generation is of the same order of magnitude as the effect being
measured.  On balance, to date the publicly available data provides no reason for the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission to change its conclusion that there is no evidence of strategic
withholding nor any proof that no strategic withholding has occurred.
By contrast, there is general agreement that the California electricity market design is “seriously
flawed.”  Furthermore, there is evidence that the policy responses that have been adopted in
California have accelerated an already serious market collapse.  Hence, without dismissing the
possibility of the exercise of market power, the principal policy focus should be on fashioning
workable solutions for the other more serious problems in market design that relate to the
underlying causes of the market meltdown.
Separate from market power mitigation, California should pay its bills, raise incremental prices
to retail customers, and move as quickly as possible to operating a coordinated and efficient
market with consistent pricing for all that includes unit commitment, day-ahead scheduling, and
real-time balancing.  Although not a panacea, these steps would address immediate problems and
set the stage for longer-term initiatives to expand generation capacity, transmission
infrastructure, and the reach of an efficient market to the western interconnected grid.1
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The continuing high prices in the California electricity market have elicited a sustained interest
in understanding the reasons for the high prices.  Design of effective policies to moderate prices
or mitigate their effects depends on the diagnosis of the causes.  For example, high prices
attributable to bad market design would indicate a need for changes in the design.  High prices
attributable largely to an exercise of market power in electric generation would point to
particular market participants and behaviors that could be targeted for regulatory action.  High
prices attributable to higher fuel prices, environmental constraints and capacity shortages, on the
other hand, would prompt actions to address the cost of fuel and environmental limitations and
indicate that retail loads should receive the appropriate price signal for conservation.
Suppliers could affect market prices by strategically withholding some capacity in order to profit
on the capacity actually sold in the market. Hence, market power is defined as the ability to
withhold production on some units in order to increase market prices and profit more from
production on other units. By contrast, simply charging high prices during periods of scarcity is
not classified as exercising market power if there is no strategic withholding of supply.
2
Likewise, refusing to supply without being paid is not an exercise of market power.
                                               
1  Scott Harvey is a Director with LECG, LLC, an economic and management consulting company.  William
Hogan is the Lucius N. Littauer Professor of Public Policy and Administration at the John F. Kennedy School of
Government, Harvard University.  This study was supported by Mirant.  The authors are or have been
consultants on electricity market design and transmission pricing, market power or generation valuation issues
for American National Power; Brazil Power Exchange Administrator (ASMAE); British National Grid
Company; Calpine Corporation; Commonwealth Edison; Constellation Power Source; Detroit Edison;
Duquesne Light Company; Electricity Corporation of New Zealand; General Electric Capital; GPU, Inc. (and
the Supporting Companies of PJM); GPU PowerNet Pty Ltd.; ISO New England; Midwest ISO; National
Independent Energy Producers; New England Power; New York Energy Association; New York ISO; New
York Power Pool; New York Utilities Collaborative; Niagara Mohawk Corporation; Ontario IMO;  PJM Office
of the Interconnection; Reliant Energy; San Diego Gas & Electric; Sempra Energy; Mirant/Southern Energy;
TransÉnergie; Transpower of New Zealand Ltd.; Westbrook Power; Williams Energy Group; and Wisconsin
Electric Power Company. Jasper Camacho, John Jankowski, Matthew Kunkle, Ana Palomares, Joel Sachar and
Jennifer Vanderhart provided research assistance.  The views presented here are not necessarily attributable to
any of those mentioned, and any errors are solely the responsibility of the authors.
2  Another complication is the possibility of exercising market power by producing too much in order to create
system bottlenecks.  This is not addressed here.  See for instance, Judith B. Cardell, Carrie Cullen Hitt and2
It is widely recognized that the potential for exercising market power through strategic
withholding exists in electricity markets in many regions of the country, and California is no
exception.  As a result, policies are already in place to mitigate market power, and market
monitoring to detect the exercise of market power is a major and growing activity in restructured
electricity markets.  For example, in California a number of generating plants have been under
Reliability Must Run (RMR) contracts in part to mitigate the exercise of market power.  Both the
California Independent System Operator (CAISO) and Power Exchange (PX) have had
independent external monitoring committees and internal staff devoted to the analysis of market
performance.
Of course, no market can be perfectly competitive or perfectly free from some exercise of market
power.  But there is a legitimate policy concern if strategic behavior by market participants
becomes pervasive and significant.  With prices exploding starting in about June of 2000, the
concern in California has been that market power beyond that resident in owners of RMR plants
was both available and exploited to a degree that explained all or a large part of the price
increase and apparent supply shortage in the latter half of 2000.  Although the potential for
withholding exists for many suppliers, the focus of attention has been on the exercise of market
power by thermal generators in California.  If there has been significant strategic withholding by
anyone, including thermal generators, the analysis should identify the responsible parties and the
appropriate remedies would be clearer.
On its face, the experience of extremely high prices suggests that the exercise of market power
could be important.  But at the same time the data show that there have been profound changes in
the California market such that the thermal generators have actually increased their production
more than demand has grown.  Furthermore, the widespread impacts of higher prices throughout
the western market, both on and off peak, suggest that if the exercise of market power is
important it is occurring to an extent and through channels unprecedented in this or other
electricity markets.  In short, this is a complicated story, and there is ample room for further
investigation of the data and diagnosis of causes.
It is important to understand the reason for the high electricity prices in California, both for
developing policies in California and so that the rest of the nation can avoid similar outcomes.  It
is therefore important to identify the exercise of market power, if it has been an important
contributor to these high prices.  At the same time, it is important to critically examine the
implication that exercise of market power is the dominant explanation for outcomes in
California.  A conviction that the major problems in the California market arise largely from the
exercise of market power in electricity generation could distract from consideration of more
fundamental problems.  However, if the principal sources of high prices in California lie
elsewhere, then a policy preoccupation with market power will lead to choices that exacerbate
and prolong the period of high wholesale market prices in California or a broader region.
From this perspective, an important public policy question arises in understanding and testing the
data and analyses directed at the estimation of the extent and importance of the exercise of
                                                                                                                                                      
William W. Hogan, "Market Power and Strategic Interaction in Electricity Networks," Resource and Energy
Economics., Vol. 19, 1997, pp. 109-1373
market power.  If the data indicate that the exercise of market power is a substantial problem in
California, then policies to mitigate the exercise of market power in electric generation should be
a priority, and may be all that is needed.  If, however, the evidence points to the exercise of
market power as a secondary concern compared to perhaps market design, environmental limits,
gas and generation supply, then the focus of public policy should be different.
The flow of market power analyses is increasing, and the debate is unsettled.  The principal
conclusion here is that with the available data in the public domain, and the special
complications introduced by the California market design, the margin of error in estimating
possible exercise of market power in electric generation through strategic withholding is of the
same order of magnitude as the effect being measured.
3  In this regard, it is unlikely that the
exercise of market power is extensive, easy to detect, or easy to correct.  By contrast, there is
general agreement that the California market design is “seriously flawed.”  Hence, without
dismissing the possibility of the exercise of market power, the principal policy focus should be
on fashioning workable solutions for the other more serious problems in market design.
II.   ANALYSES OF MARKET POWER
The accumulation of market power studies is expanding at a rate that is not surprising given the
importance of the shock to the California market and, as we shall see, the difficulty of untangling
a complicated story.  The various studies directed at assessing the role of generator market power
in elevating California electricity prices during the year 2000 have reached conflicting
conclusions.  In some cases, indirect evidence has been found to support an interpretation that
there must have been an exercise of market power through withholding; however, the very nature
of such indirect analysis precludes the identification of the particular parties who were
responsible.
4  In other instances the analyses found the story to be more complicated, with
explanations of the data that either did not indicate the exercise of market power or found the
evidence unable to support any conclusion.
5
As time passes, the horizon for studies assessing the impact of price increases extends
correspondingly.
6  As we move beyond the end of year 2000, there is a need to account for an
                                               
3  We have not examined the possible exercise of market power in gas supply, transmission, storage or
distribution.
4  Frank Wolak, Robert Nordhaus, and Carl Shapiro, “An Analysis of the June 2000 Price Spikes in the California
ISO’s Energy and Ancillary Service Markets,” September 6, 2000 (hereafter MSC).  Eric Hildebrandt,
“Declaration of Eric Hildebrandt,” October 2000 (hereafter Hildebrandt Oct), and Eric Hildebrandt “Analysis of
Market Power in California’s Wholesale Energy Markets,” November 21, 2000 (hereafter Hildebrandt Nov).
5  Staff Report to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission on Western Markets and the Causes of the Summer
2000 Price Abnormalities, Part I, November 1, 2000 (hereafter Staff Report); Scott Harvey and William W.
Hogan, “Issues in the Analysis of Market Power in California,” October 27, 2000 (hereafter Harvey-Hogan);
California Power Exchange Corp, Compliance Unit, “Price Movements in California Electricity Markets,”
September 29, 2000 (hereafter CALPX); Report on Plant Outages in the State of California, FERC Office of the
General Counsel Market Oversight & Enforcement and Office of Markets, Tariffs and Rates, Division of
Energy Markets, February 1, 2001 (hereafter FERC Outage Report).
6  For example, Eric Hildebrandt, "Further Analyses of the Exercise and Cost Impacts of Market Power in
California's Wholesale Energy Market," California Independent System Operator, March 2001; Anjali Sheffrin,4
increasing accumulation of market failures, including the introduction of credit problems and
new price regulations, both of which further complicate the analysis of the market.  Nonetheless,
as of the end of the first quarter 2001, the more recent analyses had not resolved the uncertainty.
7
Hence, the focus of the analysis below is restricted to the year 2000, with an emphasis on the
data for the Summer of 2000 that has received the most attention.
For the period covering the Summer of 2000, a paper by Paul Joskow and Edward Kahn carries
the analysis further than the previous studies in an attempt to move beyond the limitations of
indirect detection of an exercise of market power by some anonymous market participant to more
directly identify thermal generators that might be withholding output in a strategic exercise of
market power that contributed to the high wholesale market prices for electricity in California
during the summer of 2000.
8  The purpose of the analysis below is to carry forward the
examination of the market, further discussing the simulation studies and extending Joskow and
Kahn’s analysis of real-time operating data.  The identification of strategic withholding in real
time is an important question, and also a difficult question to address, particularly for someone
lacking access to the dispatch data.  Here we expand our previous discussion to identify some of
the issues to be addressed in distinguishing strategic withholding from other causes of high
prices, examine further some of the evidence, and suggest some of the policy implications of our
current understanding of the state of the market.
It is difficult to conduct a study of market power based solely on publicly available data.  On
balance, however, we do not see that the evidence to date provides reason for the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (FERC) to change its conclusion that there is no evidence of
withholding nor any proof that no withholding has occurred.
9  The Joskow-Kahn simulation
study improves on certain elements of the earlier MSC study that were likely to understate the
competitive price level, but relies on approximations of demand that are likely to understate the
competitive price relative to the prior MSC study, and the proxies for hydro and geothermal
supply may have the same effect.  In addition, the Joskow-Kahn simulation shares limitations
with the MSC study regarding the treatment of start-up and no-load costs, non-allowance
environmental restrictions, outage rates, uncertainty, and market inefficiency that are likely to
cause the simulation to understate the competitive price level.
As Joskow and Kahn note, the data analyzed in their innovative study of real-time withholding
does not provide evidence that can distinguish between strategic withholding and other market
factors.  If the data used in their analysis are adjusted for the hours in which real-time prices
were low or units were likely to be ramping, their measure of an output gap is far less, rather
than more, than ancillary service procurement, reversing the sign of their principal indicator of
                                                                                                                                                      
"Empirical Evidence of Strategic Bidding in California ISO Real Time  Market," California Independent
System Operator, March 21, 2001.
7  California Independent System Operator, "Response of the California Independent System Opertor (sic)
Corporation to Letter Order of March 30, 2001," Submission to Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, April
6, 2001, pp. 2-3.
8  Paul L. Joskow and Edward Kahn, “A Quantitative Analysis of Pricing Behavior in California’s Electricity
Market During Summer 2000,” January 2001 (hereafter Joskow-Kahn).
9  Staff Report, pp. 1-4, 5-16. FERC Outage Report, pp. 1, 52.5
possible strategic withholding.  This measure of an output gap is overstated by an indeterminate
amount because it does not account for real-time deratings, the impact of intra-zonal congestion,
environmental output limits, uncertainty and market inefficiency and may be based on overstated
capacities.  On the other hand, the relationship between the estimated output gap and ancillary
service procurement does not establish that there was no withholding because it is not known
how much ancillary services were procured from fossil units not included in the real-time output
data (particularly gas turbines) or from hydro or geothermal units.  Moreover, a large element of
uncertainty is introduced into these comparisons by a lack of information on how replacement
and other reserves were actually dispatched by the system operator in real time.
The point of these comments is not that it is impossible to detect economic withholding.  Most of
the ambiguity arises from a lack of public information on factors that ISOs would routinely take
into account in the real-time operation of the transmission system.  While it will at times be
difficult to distinguish between economic withholding and market inefficiency, or pricing
intended to manage limited energy units or environmental constraints, most of the other
uncertainties plaguing the analysis of the publicly available data should not hinder identification
of withholding from ISO dispatch data.
The import of the Joskow-Kahn analysis is not to prove that market power has been exercised
but, rather, to suggest that it might be important.  The import of the sensitivity analysis here is
not to prove that market power has not been exercised but, rather, to suggest that it is unlikely to
be the dominant factor and may not even be significant.  By contrast, there appears to be little
disagreement that other problems of shortage and bad market design are at least large enough to
dictate that the solution requires more than just market power mitigation devices.
An important feature of the Joskow-Kahn study is that it came at a time when it had become
reasonably clear that a simple theory of anticompetitive withholding of thermal generating
capacity from the California market is not consistent with the events of the year 2000. Since at
least November, with the benefit of 20-20 hindsight, it has been apparent that some of the
thermal generators suspected of withholding output in the earlier part of the year had actually
supplied too much output in the earlier part of the year, causing them to reach annual run time or
other environmental limits and to be shut down completely by environmental regulations or
restricted to running only in emergency conditions. Generators that have been shut down by
environmental regulations for running too long and too hard during this period seem not to have
engaged in simple anti-competitive withholding of output. In hindsight, these units were
supplying too much output, not too little, during much of the year and should have offered their
output at higher prices than they did.  In light of this evidence, it is not sufficient in establishing
the existence of anticompetitive withholding to demonstrate that particular generators were
providing less output than their design capacity in high-priced hours.  We are reminded that
when cumulative constraints are binding, were it not for the constraint, generators would have an
interest in producing more at lower prices.  A theory of anticompetitive withholding must
demonstrate that thermal generators with cumulative output constraints offered too much output
at too low prices in some hours and too little output at too high prices in other hours, and did so
in a manner that predictably increased profits.  This is a much more complex analysis than any
that has been undertaken.6
III.   ANALYTICAL ISSUES
It is difficult in many industries to clearly distinguish price increases arising largely from the
exercise of market power from price increases arising from other changes in market conditions.
A number of unique features of the California electricity market, such as one-part bids, and
separate non-cooptimized markets for energy, ancillary services and congestion management,
greatly complicate assessment of competitive behavior in the California electricity market,
making the task more difficult than usual.
Moreover, in analyzing performance in the California electricity market it is important to
recognize that a demonstration that the observed outcomes are inconsistent with those in an
efficient competitive market does not necessarily imply that the market is not operating
competitively; the market may simply be clearing very inefficiently as a result of the market
design.  The California market design explicitly prevented the central market operator, the
CAISO, from coordinating efficient markets for energy, ancillary services or congestion
management, and it has been widely predicted that the result would be inefficient market
outcomes and higher costs to consumers.
10  While the large increases in wholesale market prices
are a subject of public policy concern regardless of the source of these increases, in prescribing
remedies it is important to understand whether the principal cause of price increases has been the
exercise of market power, poor market design, changes in market conditions or other elements of
public policy.  Prescribing remedies based on the presumption that the price increases arise
solely or largely from the exercise of market power will only prolong the agony if the actual
source of the problem lies elsewhere.
The marginal cost of electric generators in California depend on several factors, including heat
rates (Btu/kWh), the cost of fuel (e.g., oil or gas), NOx allowance costs and variable O&M costs.
As any of these factors increase, the marginal cost of the generator will increase.
11  At historic
fuel and allowance cost levels the incremental cost of a GT of the type assumed by FERC in its
proxy price analysis (18,073 Btu/kWh, 2 lbs. NOx/MWh, $2/MWh O&M) would have
                                               
10  See, for example, William W. Hogan, “A Wholesale Pool Spot Market Must Be Administered by the
Independent System Operator: Avoiding the Separation Fallacy,” Electricity Journal, December 1995; Steven
Stoft, “Analysis of the California WEPEX Applications to FERC,” October 8, 1996; Steven Stoft, “California’s
ISO: Why Not Clear the Market,” Electricity Journal, December 1996; Eric Woychik, “California’s Schedule
Coordinator: Market Maker with Advantage,” November 26, 1997; William W. Hogan, “Rethinking WEPEX:
What’s Wrong with Least Cost?” Public Utilities Fortnightly, January 1, 1998; Steven Stoft, “Gaming Intra-
Zonal Congestion in California,” March 6, 1998; Larry Ruff, “Separation of the ISO from the Power Exchange:
Some Structural and Operational Implications,” October 25, 1995.  Larry Ruff, “The California PX Auction:
Whatever Happened to the ISO and Why Should Anybody Care,” UC Power Conference, March 10, 1997;
Richard O’Neill, “Rules and Institutions for Imperfect Markets,” Harvard Electricity Policy Group, January 10,
1997; Charles R. Imbrecht, Statement before the Senate Select Committee on Business Development,
November 29, 1995; and Charles R. Imbrecht, Statement before the FERC, Technical Conference on the
WEPEX Applications, August 1, 1996.
11  FERC uses these factors in setting its California proxy price, see FERC, Order Directing Sellers to Provide
Refunds of Excess Amounts Charged for Certain Electric Energy Sales During January 2001 or Alternatively,
to Provide Further Cost or Other Justification for Such Charges, March 9, 2001, Docket No. EL00-95-017 et al.7
incremental costs in the range of $58/MWh).
12  At prices of $10/Mmbtu for gas and $40 for
allowances, the incremental cost of electricity would be in the vicinity of $262/MWh.
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There are at least four general approaches that could be taken to address questions of
withholding and market power in the California electricity market.  One approach would be to
test directly whether particular thermal generating capacity has been anticompetitively withheld
from the day-ahead market.  A second more indirect approach would be to simulate the
competitive level of day-ahead prices and compare them to actual day-ahead prices.  A third
direct approach would be to test whether particular thermal generating capacity has been
anticompetitively withheld from the real-time market.  A fourth and again indirect approach
would be to simulate the competitive level of real-time prices and compare them to actual real-
time prices.  Within these general approaches, there are additional choices in how these tests
would be applied. A fundamental problem in addressing market power issues with any or all of
these approaches is that the margin of error may well be larger than the magnitude of the effects
that one is attempting to measure.  Hence, even with the best of analysis, the policy conclusions
may not be clear.  Estimates of a small amount of strategic withholding may not be statistically
significant, and correcting behavior that produced a small amount of withholding may not have a
material effect on prices.  What would be relevant from a public policy perspective would be
reasonably unambiguous evidence of a large amount of strategic withholding.  The difficulties
are not insurmountable in principle, and the importance of the questions is sufficient to justify
the effort to untangle the various contributions to the observed result of high prices.
The application of any of these approaches to the identification of the exercise of market power
requires that the analysis:
•  Account for fuel, O&M,
14 and NOx emission allowance costs;
•  Account for environmental output restrictions other than NOx allowances, such as water
temperature restrictions or annual operating hour or capacity factor restrictions;
•  Account for the impact of transmission congestion (inter- and intra-zonal congestion and
RMR calls in California);
•  Account for capacity used to provide ancillary services (regulation, spinning reserves, 10-
minute reserves, and potentially replacement reserves);
•  Account for capacity not available due to forced or maintenance outages or unit
deratings; and
                                               
12  18.073mmBtu/MW*$3/mmbtu gas + 1$/lb. NOx * 2lb./MW+ $2/MWh O&M
13  18.073mmBtu/MW*$10/mmbtu gas + 30$/lb. NOx * 2lb./MW+ $2/MWh O&M
14  Including any extraordinary O&M costs that might be incurred at very high operating levels as a result of
increased risk of triggering a partial or unit wide forced outage, or as a result of continued operation of the unit
after mechanical failures have occurred.  See, for example, FERC Outage Report, pp. 27, 34 and 49.8
•  Distinguish between the effects of withholding and imperfect foresight and/or market
inefficiency.
Under the first approach, the identification of anticompetitive withholding of capacity in the day-
ahead market is further complicated by the need to:
•  Account for capacity not sold in the day-ahead market because the day-ahead price was
below the expected real-time price;
15
•  Account for capacity not sold in the day-ahead market because prices in the day-ahead
market were not expected to be high enough to recover the start-up and/or minimum-load
costs of the unit;
•  Account for capacity not sold in the California day-ahead market because the output of
that capacity was sold in other WSCC markets; and
•  Account for bidding strategies intended to hedge outage risk.
While the application of this first approach requires considerable information, much of this
information would be routinely available to an ISO coordinating a day-ahead market.  The
application of this approach to the California market, however, is made particularly difficult,
even for the California ISO, by a number of unique features of the California market.  In
particular; 1) the California ISO does not operate a day-ahead energy market; 2) the bids into the
California day-ahead energy market used for most analyses ( i.e., the PX market) are in the form
of portfolio bids.  These supply offers are not tied to the capacity of any specific unit, and do not
include capacity intended to be used to provide ancillary services (which would be separately bid
into markets coordinated by the CAISO); 3) both the ISO and PX markets are based on one-part
bids; 4) the CAISO does not manage intra-zonal transmission congestion in the day-ahead
market and accepts infeasible transmission schedules in the day-ahead market; and 5) the day-
ahead markets operated by the PX and ISO have a number of pay-as-bid elements that introduce
inefficiencies and bidding incentives that must be distinguished from the exercise of market
power.
16
Tests for the exercise of market power based on the simulation of day-ahead prices simplify the
task by avoiding the need to account for arbitrage of day-ahead and real-time prices (because the
approach attempts to estimate equilibrium day-ahead and real-time prices), but must:
                                               
15  In other markets, such as PJM and New York, suppliers would probably be more likely to use demand bids
(internal or external virtual demand bids in PJM and external virtual demand bids in New York) to arbitrage
day-ahead and real-time prices than generation bids, to avoid profit reducing distortions in the unit commitment.
There is no such incentive to use demand bids for arbitrage under the California market design and the
separation of the ISO and PX, and the PX cost allocation rules appear to make it more expensive for generators
to use load, rather than supply bids, to arbitrage day-ahead and real-time prices.
16  Thus, if energy prices in the PX are lower than expected, the day-ahead ancillary services offers may be based
on different assumptions regarding the configuration of on-line capacity than those which underlay the portfolio
offers into the PX.9
•  Account for  the impact on commitment decisions of start-up and minimum-load costs
and other unit characteristics;
•  Account for  the impact of real-time events (generation and transmission outages,
erroneous load forecasts) that raise day-ahead and expected real-time prices relative to
simulated prices; and
•  Account for the supply and bidding behavior of non-thermal generation, import supply
and export demand.
Even with good data and models, simulation studies have a number of limitations in estimating
competitive price levels that might be used to identify the exercise of market power.  First, it is in
practice difficult to calibrate a simulation model to replicate real-world supply and demand
patterns (i.e., load variations, generation outages and transmission outages), yet failure to do so
can result in differences between real-world and simulated prices that are unrelated to
competitive behavior.  Second, it is important, but difficult, to accurately model reserve
requirements and identify reserve shortages in the simulation.  Third, most simulations do not
directly account for the effect of supply and demand shocks that occur following the unit
commitment decision.  Thus, simulation approaches that determine load and outages prior to the
unit commitment step and then dispatch the committed units to meet the load will not fully
capture the volatility of real-time prices or the impact of expected real-time prices on day-ahead
bids and prices.  Fourth, it is difficult to model import supply and export demand so as to
accurately reflect the prices at which imports are available in relation to internal supply and
demand conditions.  Fifth, it is difficult to include the effects of inefficient market design in a
simulation.  Sixth, a full year or more of data would be needed to address the impact of
cumulative annual output limits.
The third approach, tests of withholding from the real-time market, can avoid some of the
complexities associated with the simulation approach by focusing on real-time economic
withholding by on-line units, and can take the unit commitment as given.  Still these tests cannot
always easily identify physical withholding of the capacity of off-line units.
Finally, simulation models could be applied to the real-time dispatch to test whether actual real-
time prices are consistent with the simulated level of prices.  Simulating real-time prices is
simpler than simulating day-ahead prices because the unit commitment can be taken as given,
but otherwise must address essentially the same difficulties noted above with regard to
simulations of day-ahead prices.
While all of these tests are at best difficult to apply, ISOs in the course of their real-time dispatch
acquire most of the information needed to assess whether there has been substantial economic
withholding in real time.  Thus, the ISO dispatch data reveals which units were on-line in real-
time, which on-line units and off-line quick-start units were using undispatched capacity to
provide ancillary services (and particularly which units were being dispatched out of merit to
maintain 10-minute reserves), and which capacity could not be dispatched because of
transmission congestion, generation outages or generation deratings.  Moreover, many
environmental restrictions on output are in part implemented by the ISO, and are thus accounted10
for in the dispatch (such as restrictions permitting the use of some capacity only during various
stages of emergency conditions).
Review of the dispatch data would not avoid all complications in identifying economic
withholding in real time.  First, it would still be necessary to account for the impact of any
environmental output restrictions not administered by the ISO.  Second, it would be necessary to
account for intra-day gas prices and O&M costs associated with operating at high output rates.
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Third, it would be necessary to distinguish between the effect of market inefficiency and
economic withholding.
18 Fourth, other information would be needed to determine whether real-
time prices were elevated by physical, rather than economic, withholding.
The task of identifying real-time withholding is much more difficult for those lacking access to
real-time dispatch information.  Absent such information, it cannot be determined whether
undispatched capacity was economically withheld, providing ancillary services, constrained
down due to transmission congestion, or unavailable due to deratings or environmental output
restrictions.  Limited to public data, the analyses so far have been incomplete and unable to
identify which, if any, of the thermal generators have been consistently withholding capacity in a
strategic effort to raise prices above competitive market clearing levels.
IV.  EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF MARKET POWER
A.  Overview
The paper by Paul Joskow and Edward Kahn goes further with public data than any before and
attempts to empirically assess whether the exercise of market power contributed materially to the
high wholesale market prices for electricity in California during the summer of 2000, using
variations on both the second and third approaches discussed above.  First, to motivate a more
detailed examination of the data they employ a simulation methodology similar to that
previously utilized by Borenstein, Bushnell, and Wolak
19 and the MSC, to simulate the
competitive level of wholesale prices in California.
20  Second, they utilize EPA and WSCC hour
by hour output data for individual thermal generators to assess whether economic capacity was
withheld from the market in real-time during high priced hours in the June to September 2000
period.
21
Although the Joskow-Kahn paper takes better account in its simulation analysis of NOx emission
costs than either the BB&W or MSC papers, the analysis faces many of the same limitations as
                                               
17  Some units may incur increased outage risks or additional O&M costs at very high operating levels.  Because
units rarely operate at these levels, their existence may be uncertain and at least hard to verify.
18  This would in principle be possible by comparing the degree of economic withholding across otherwise
similarly situated firms having large and small shares of the real-time market.
19  Severin Borenstein, James Bushnell and Frank Wolak, “Diagnosing Market Power in California’s Restructured
Wholesale Electricity Market,” August 2000 (hereafter BB&W).
20  Joskow-Kahn, pp. 10-20.
21  Joskow-Kahn, pp. 22-33.11
the earlier studies, as well as having some new problems arising from differences in data and
methodology.  In particular, the Joskow-Kahn study has limitations with respect to accounting
for:  environmental restrictions other than NOx allowances; intra-zonal congestion and RMR
calls; capacity not available due to forced or maintenance outages or deratings; the impact of
start-up and no-load costs and operating inflexibilities; the supply of non-thermal generation and
imports; the impact of reserve requirements and the distinction between market inefficiency and
anticompetitive withholding.  The limitations of the data and methodology generally have the
effect that the simulation is likely to understate the competitive level of prices, potentially
materially so, and thus suggest the presence of anticompetitive economic withholding, even if
the market were operating competitively, but inefficiently.
Joskow and Kahn break new ground in attempting to use EPA and WSCC data to go beyond the
simulation and assess whether output was economically withheld during June 2000 by examining
actual real-time output data rather than simulation results.  Again, however, it is seen that the
data and methodological approach has a number of limitations that may cause the analysis to
identify economic withholding when none is occurring.  In particular, the Joskow-Kahn study
has limitations with respect to accounting for environmental restrictions other than NOx
allowances, capacity not available due to deratings, capacity used to provide ancillary services,
and capacity not dispatched because of real-time congestion or balancing requirements.
Moreover, the hours in which withholding is identified include hours in which real-time prices
were low for all or portions of the hour, accounting for lower output than in hours with high real-
time prices.  The present paper replicates the Joskow-Kahn analysis of real-time withholding and
extends it to address some of these limitations.  The revised analysis suggests that there might, or
might not, have been material real-time withholding; there are too many unknowns to draw
conclusions.
A fundamental problem with both approaches employed by Joskow and Kahn to identify the
exercise of market power is that the margin of error in the methodology and data may be larger
than the magnitude of the effects we are trying to identify.  This does not mean that withholding
cannot be identified, the point is rather that these very indirect methods of inferring the existence
of economic or physical withholding have a large measure of error relative to the size of the
effect.  As suggested above, economic withholding that is very difficult to indirectly identify
under the Joskow-Kahn, MSC and BB&W methodologies, will often be readily apparent in the
dispatch data available to the system operator, particularly in real-time.  The dispatch data will
reveal which units:  were providing reserves or regulation with capacity not dispatched to meet
load; were constrained down by the ISO due to congestion; were dispatched down in real-time
by the ISO to balance load and generation; or were output limited because they had not been
released from environmental output restrictions.  Moreover, the dispatch data will reveal what
capacity was not dispatched because the capacity was not offered to the system operator (which
could reflect outages, environmental restrictions, or physical withholding) and what capacity was
not dispatched because it was economically withheld from providing either energy or ancillary
services.
22
                                               
22  The dispatch data alone, however, will not reveal whether capacity is being physically withheld from the real-
time market to exercise market power or because it is not available due to outages; whether capacity is being12
B.  Price Simulation Analyses
1.  Overview
The Joskow-Kahn simulation of day-ahead prices follows the methodology of the BB&W and
MSC papers, but provides a much improved simulation of the impact of NOx allowance costs.
The Joskow-Kahn simulation also takes better account of the full ancillary service requirements
of the California ISO.
23
Prices in the California electricity market since June 2000 appear to have been importantly
affected by the prices for NOx emission allowances.  The South Coast Air Quality Management
District (SCAQMD) RTC program caps and reduces NOx allowances in the Los Angeles region
by allocating emission allowances to historical pollution sources and permitting these allowances
to be bought and sold in a free market.  Although individual allowances are allocated for a one-
year period and cannot be carried forward, the RTC program allocates allowances on a January 1
to December 31 cycle to some firms and a July 1 to June 30 cycle to other firms.  This provides a
degree of inter-temporal flexibility as emission sources on the July 1 to June 30 cycle can buy
allowances from emission sources on the January 1 to December 31 cycle if supply is tight for
the cycle ending June 30 and sell allowances for use by those on the later cycle if they are long.
A central fact in understanding California electricity prices during 2000 is that due to a
combination of ratcheting down of emission levels (reducing the supply of emission allowances
as shown in Figure 1 below) and low hydro conditions resulting in unusually high output levels
by thermal electricity generators (see Figure 5 below), emission allowances prices in the
SCAWMD region rose far above historical levels.
                                                                                                                                                      
economically withheld from the real-time market to exercise market power or to allocate limited energy to the
highest valued hours; or whether capacity is offered at very high prices because operation of the unit at such
high levels carries a significant risk of triggering a forced outage.
23  The Joskow-Kahn simulation includes in its measure of demand the CAISO demand for capacity to provide all
ancillary services, estimated by Joskow and Kahn to be roughly 10 percent of load, rather than only including
the capacity used for regulation as in the BB&W and MSC studies (Joskow-Kahn, p. 12).  This methodological
change would, other things equal, cause the study to identify more hours of shortage during the summer of 2000
than did the MSC study.13
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Source:  Reproduced from: South Coast Air Quality Management District, Review of RECLAIM
Findings, October 20, 2000, p. 1-6 (hereafter RECLAIM Findings).
Unfortunately, while it is clear that emission allowance prices rose (see Figure 2), the nature of
the process by which these prices are reported and available to electricity market analysts gives
rise to some ambiguity in exactly at what point in time allowance prices rose to exactly what
level.  The Joskow-Kahn simulation analysis both takes these allowance costs into account and
addresses the uncertainty in the time path of allowance prices by simulating electricity prices for
a variety of allowance price levels.
24
                                               
24  Joskow-Kahn, Table 2, p. 16.  It is, however, somewhat unclear what emission rates were assumed in
calculating these prices.  Joskow and Kahn note that the emission rates utilized in their analysis are based on
publicly available data and regulatory filings but the data and filings are not identified.14
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Source: Reproduced from RECLAIM Findings, p. 6-4.
The Joskow-Kahn simulation study also provides an improved modeling of California reserve
requirements.  Previous simulation studies of day-ahead prices (in particular those of BB&W and
the MSC) dispatched generation resources to meet load plus upward regulation requirements.
This approach of the previous studies has three limitations.  First, this approach would
sometimes fail to indicate hours of capacity shortage because the measure of required capacity
does not include reserves.  Thus, a capacity shortage would exist whenever the available
generation resources were insufficient to meet load (including losses) plus upward regulation
requirements plus reserve requirements even if there were sufficient capacity available to meet
load and provide upward regulation.
Second, this previous approach would also have the potential to understate the cost of meeting
load in both shortage and non-shortage conditions because it implicitly assumes that CAISO
reserve requirements can be met entirely with undispatched extra-marginal capacity.  In practice,
however, spinning and 10-minute reserve requirements must be carried on capacity capable of
increasing output by the amount of the reserve requirement within ten minutes.
25  System
operators therefore often find it necessary to reduce output on infra-marginal generators in order
to maintain sufficient ramping capability on the units providing reserves such that the reserves
could be dispatched within ten minutes in the event of a contingency.
26  This reduction in the
output of infra-marginal generators correspondingly forces the dispatch of higher-cost extra-
marginal generation to meet load.  This is illustrated for a very simple market in Table 3.  The
example assumes that the system operator seeks to carry 60 MW of reserves, that 25 MW can be
carried on high-cost hydro and GT units that are not generating and that the remaining 35 MW
                                               
25  See WSCC Minimum Operating Reliability Criteria, p. 2.
26 It is important to keep in mind that the main purpose of 10-minute reserves is to maintain the reliability of the
transmission system in the event of the sudden loss of a large generator or transmission line.15
must be carried on gas units.  Column (B) sets forth assumed ramp rates for the gas units and it is
seen that the 35 MW of reserves must be carried both on the marginal and infra-marginal cost
units.  As a result, there is 1,040 MW of capacity on-line to meet 990 MW of load and the
market price of energy is $70/MWh.
 Table 3











Nuke 1 100 @ 0 0 100 0
Nuke 2 100 @ 0 0 100 0
Cogen 3 100 @ 5 0 100 0
Coal 4 100 @ 17 5 100 0
Gas 5 100 @ 30 10 100 0
Gas 6 100 @ 35 10 100 0
Gas 7 100 @ 35 10 90 0
Import 8 100 @ 40 0 100
Gas 9 100 @ 5 10 90 10
Gas 10 50 @ 50 5 45 5
Gas 11 50 @ 60 5 45 5
Gas 12 40 @ 70 5 20 5
Gas 13 40 @ 80 5
GT 10 @ 75 10 0 10
Hydro 15 @ 80 15 0 15
Load = 990      Reserves = 60
If the prices for this electric system were simulated taking account only of the need to meet load,
ignoring reserve requirements, it would be possible to meet load with only 1,000 MW of
capacity, as shown in Table 4, and Gas 12 would not be dispatched.  The simulated market price
of energy would be only $60/MWh compared to the actual price of $70/MWh.  We do not know
the extent to which the need to maintain 10-minute reserve levels in practice requires the CAISO
to dispatch higher-cost generation than would otherwise be the case.  It is our experience,
however, that it would be an unusual on-peak hour in which the need to maintain 10-minute and
spinning reserves did not raise the market price of energy in New York.  The omission of reserve
requirements from the BB&W and MSC analyses is therefore likely to have depressed the
simulated prices compared to market prices, at least during peak hours.16
Table 4








Nuke 1 100 @ 0 100 0
Nuke 2 100 @ 0 100 0
Cogen 3 100 @ 5 100 0
Coal 4 100 @ 17 100 0
Gas 5 100 @ 30 100 0
Gas 6 100 @ 35 100 0
Gas 7 100 @ 35 100 0
Import 8 100 @ 40 100
Gas 9 100 @ 45 100 0
Gas 10 50 @ 50 50 0
Gas 11 50 @ 60 40 0
Gas 12 40 @ 70 0 0
Gas 13 40 @ 80 0
GT 10 @ 75 0 0
Hydro 15 @ 80 0 0
Load = 990
The Joskow-Kahn study corrects for these downward biases by modeling load as actual load plus
10 percent to account for reserves plus upward regulation.
27  This procedure should correct for
the considerations discussed above, permitting the analysis to identify capacity shortage hours
and avoid the potential understatement of the market price of energy.  In fact, this approach
would have the potential to cause the simulation to overstate the competitive market price of
energy because it would implicitly assume that all reserves are provided by infra-marginal
generation which would also be an inaccurate assumption.  Thus, in the example portrayed in
Table 4, such an assumption would entail meeting load of 1,050 MW, which would require
dispatching the GT at $75/MWh.
28 If we correctly understand the Joskow-Kahn methodology for
accounting for reserves, it would eliminate this source of downward bias in the simulation results
                                               
27  Joskow-Kahn, p. 12.  “We add 10% to each demand level reflecting the CAISO’s demand for ancillary services
capacity.”
28 It is possible that we have not correctly understood the manner in which Joskow and Kahn have adjusted load to
account for reserves but, other things equal, their methodology would tend to cause their simulation to identify
more shortage hours than the MSC simulation.17
of BB&W and the MSC.  The Joskow-Kahn methodology provides a conservative measure of
the impact of reserves on the competitive price level.  Indeed, this methodology would in general
be too conservative.
Joskow and Kahn also utilize a more realistic fuel cost figure ($5.58/mmBtu or roughly
$32.50/bbl) for oil-fired generation than that apparently utilized in the BB&W and MSC
studies.
29 This fuel cost is still somewhat on the low side during much of 2000, but is likely
within 10 percent of the actual cost during the April to June 2000 period.
The Joskow-Kahn price simulation does not, however, appear to address a number of other
limitations of the BB&W and MSC simulation methodology that have been described in a
previous paper.
30
•  Accounting for environmental restrictions, other than NOx allowance costs;
•  Treatment of  hydro power as price taking;
•  Accounting for the impact of transmission congestion;
•  Treatment of start-up and minimum load costs;
•  Assumed outage rates; and
•  Impact of the inefficiency of the California market structure.
Moreover, the Joskow-Kahn price simulation methodology introduces some new sources of error
that were not present in the earlier analyses.  In particular, the Joskow-Kahn simulation analysis
is based on ten monthly load deciles, rather than actual hourly supply and demand, which
appears likely to result in downward biased simulations of the average competitive price by
reducing the number of shortage hours.  The Joskow-Kahn study also allocates each month’s
internal hydro power to meet load over time based on a set of assumptions rather than the actual
supply of hydro power and assumes that geothermal generation is not energy limited.  Depending
on whether these assumptions under or overstate the supply of hydro power in shortage hours
and the magnitude of the overstatement of geothermal energy supply, the methodology may over
or understate the competitive price level.
2.  Previously Discussed Methodological Problems
Methodological limitations of the BB&W and MSC studies that also appear to apply to the
Joskow-Kahn simulation study are briefly summarized below.  For a few topics for which the
Joskow-Kahn methodology is somewhat different than that applied in the earlier studies,
somewhat more discussion is provided.
                                               
29  See Harvey-Hogan, pp. 41-43.
30 See  Harvey-Hogan.18
a)   Environmental Output Restrictions (other than NOx allowance costs)
The Joskow-Kahn paper provides important improvements on the BB&W and MSC papers in its
treatment of NOx allowance costs.  Moreover, improved accounting for allowance costs results
in simulated prices that are much closer to actual prices in August and September than those
simulated by the DMA.
31  On the other hand, however, the Joskow-Kahn simulation does not
account for any of the other environmental limitations that affected output, nor does it account
for the impact of NOx limitations in areas without markets for allowances.  Two types of
environmental restrictions that need to be taken into account in simulating generation output are
NOx limitations imposed through annual operating hour or capacity factor limits and water
temperature restrictions.
Other NOx Limitations
It is widely known by now that a number of California generating plants are subject to annual
restrictions on their hours of operation or their annual capacity factor in order to limit NOx
emissions.  Plants subject to such restrictions and reaching their limits in 2000 include at least
the Reliant’s Coolwater 1 unit; Ellwood plant and Mandalay 3 unit; and Mirant’s (Southern
Energy)
32 Potrero 4, 5 and 6 units. AES’s Los Alamitos, Redondo Beach and Huntington Beach
units were also shut down during November by environmental limits.
33  These units account for
roughly 4,000-5,000 MW of capacity.
If the plants subject to these kinds of annual operating restrictions are expected to have little
chance of reaching their annual operating limit, the limits would be treated by the unit owner as
non-binding and the limits would not affect the unit owner’s bidding strategy or California
electricity prices.  If, however, it is expected that these plants will reach their annual operating
limits, then a perfectly competitive firm bidding the output of such plants into the market would
include in its bids a premium over the other incremental costs of operating the plants.  The
purpose of such a premium would be to allocate the output of such output-limited plants to the
highest-priced hours (i.e., the hours in which their energy was most valuable).
The clear reality for California in 2000 is that a number of the plants subject to such annual
operating limits used up their annual quota of operating hours prior to the end of the year.  In
some cases, such as Reliant’s Mandalay 3 and Ellwood units, mechanisms were eventually
worked out to enable the plants to continue operating, for at least a limited number of hours.
34  In
other cases, plants ceased operation.
35
                                               
31  Joskow-Kahn Table 2, p. 16; Hildebrandt Oct, p. 6 exhibit 1; Hildebrandt Nov, p.6, Table 1.
32  Since Joskow and Kahn completed their study, Southern Energy has changed its name to Mirant.  We generally
refer to the company as Mirant in this paper, except in the discussion and presentation of Joskow-Kahn output
gap findings where we refer to the company as Southern for consistency.
33  See FERC Outage Report, pp. 8, 19, 32; MW Daily, November 22, 2000, p. 2; December 1, 2000, p. 7; and
December 8, 2000, p. 8.
34  See, for example, FERC Outage Report, pp. 8, 19, 32.
35  See, for example, MW Daily, November 22, 2000, p. 2; December 1, 2000, p. 7; and December 8, 2000, p. 8;
South Coast Air Quality Management District Website (aqmd.gov/news).19
The Joskow-Kahn study assumption that additional NOx allowances were available to Los
Angeles area generators at the South Coast market price would not necessarily be applicable to
generators in other regions, which could have either lower or higher incremental costs of
acquiring NOx allowances.  For example, generating plants in San Diego are also subject to NOx
restrictions but there is no established market in which additional allowances can be acquired
once the annual allowance is exhausted.
36
It is clear in the case of plants that were shut down as a result of exhausting their annual quotas
that the competitive offer curve for these plants should include an opportunity cost for using up
an annual hour or MW-hour of output.  In addition to accounting for the output restrictions on
the units that are known to have actually reached their environmental operating limits, a
simulation analysis must account for any other environmental limits that would have been
reached had the unit operator not included an environmental opportunity cost in its bids so as to
conserve the unit’s available output.  Neither the BB&W, MSC nor Joskow-Kahn studies,
however, include such an opportunity cost in their simulations.  As a result, these studies would
overdispatch the plants subject to such restrictions, resulting in the plants exhausting their annual
operating allowance at an even earlier point in the year than was actually the case.  This
overdispatch of these plants would tend to reduce the price simulated by BB&W, MSC and
Joskow-Kahn relative to the actual market-clearing prices,
37 but the price decrease would reflect
the effect of violating environmental limits, not the impact of competition.  Because these studies
do not model environmental limits, the effects of environmental limits cannot be distinguished
from the exercise of market power.
While it is clearly necessary to account for these environmental output restrictions in a
simulation analysis, it is recognized that this is not straightforward in circumstances such as
prevailed in California in 2000.  First, in a number of instances, plants which reached their limits
were allowed to continue to operate, at least to some degree, and sometimes in conjunction with
additional payments.  In these circumstances, the expectations that would have been held by
competitive suppliers regarding the consequences of reaching their environmental operating
limits are somewhat uncertain.  Should plant owners have acted on the assumption that the
operating limits would be relaxed in this manner or should they have anticipated that they would
be shut down?
Second, the year 2000 in California was almost certainly one in which thermal plants were
utilized more heavily than was anticipated early in the year.  California ISO data show that
thermal units were not utilized more heavily in aggregate in 2000 than in 1999 until May (see
Figure 5 below).  Absent foresight of how the year would end, thermal plants subject to
environmental operating limits may have been bid into the market with no environmental
opportunity cost early in the year, under the expectation that their environmental constraints
would be non-binding.  Such a misforecast would have required higher environmental adders to
be included in bids in later months as the continued low hydro and high-load conditions made it
                                               
36  See Comments of Duke Energy North America LLC, November 22, 2000, p. 21.
37  Meaningful simulations would necessarily encompass the period covered by the run-time limitations, which
would permit verification that operating the generation facilities as assumed by the simulation would not entail
violating environmental run time or capacity factor limits.20
apparent that these units would in fact reach their environmental limits unless their running time
was carefully allocated.
There is more than one way to model these environmental limits, and reasonable people will
likely differ on the most appropriate approach.  It may in fact be desirable to simulate prices
using a range of approaches to understand the sensitivity of the simulation results to these
assumptions.  It does seem clear, however, that it is not sufficient to simulate electricity prices
for California in 2000 under the assumption that none of these environmental limits existed.
The fact that some of the plants subject to such environmental operating restrictions were
actually shutdown during 2000 because they reached  their annual operating limit is particularly
significant in evaluating the possible exercise of market power.  These units reaching their
operating limits implies that, rather than anticompetitively withholding their output from the
market to raise prices as implied by the BB&W, MSC and Joskow-Kahn methodology, these
units actually offered themselves into the market at prices that with the benefit of perfect
hindsight we now know without question were too low. Perfectly competitive firms with perfect
foresight would have offered the output of these plants into the California market during 2000 in
many hours at higher prices than those at which the output of these plants was actually offered.
The reason for such higher offer prices would be to conserve the annual operating hours of these
plants so that the units would not exhaust their ability to run prior to the end of the year.  A
theory of anticompetitive withholding of capacity that is applied to the capacity that reached its
environmental limits must therefore be premised on inefficiently low-priced supply offers in
some hours and anticompetitively high-priced supply offers in other hours, resulting in a net
increase in profits over the year.  The conditions required for such a strategy to be profitable are
complex, particularly when there are other energy-limited suppliers in the market who would
divert energy supplies from the low-priced hours to the high-priced hours.  These conditions are
not taken into account in the Joskow-Kahn, BB&W or MSC studies.
38
The impact of the annual run time and capacity factor limitations is also important in assessing
the impact on California prices of the reduction in imports.  Joskow and Kahn analyze the impact
on their simulated California electricity prices of the reduction in imports between 1999 and
2000, and include the combined effect of the reduction in imports and the increase in allowance
prices.
39  The Joskow-Kahn analysis of the impact of reduced imports on electricity prices does
not, however, take account of the cumulative impact of sustained reductions in imports on the
hours of operation of units subject to environmental restrictions on their annual output.
Thus, reduced imports in a particular hour raise electricity prices by forcing the use of higher-
cost generation, including generation with higher NOx allowance costs.  Reduced electricity
imports over the course of the summer also exhaust NOx allowances, driving up the price of
                                               
38  Indeed, such a theory does not appear to have been advanced by any study of the exercise of market power in
California.  Moreover, such a theory could not be tested with publicly available data as a test would at least
require access to data on RMR calls, the dispatch of reserves by the ISO, and unit-specific real-time adjustment
bid data.  Even with such data it would be necessary to somehow distinguish between the exercise of market
power, imperfect foresight and the effects of the price caps in accounting for why some units reached their
environmental operating limits prior to the end of the year.
39  Joskow-Kahn, pp. 17-18.21
NOx allowances, and exhaust the annual operating hours of restricted units, forcing load to be
met with higher-cost units, raising prices and inducing conservation or creating shortages.  It is
clear from CAISO data that the combination of increased demand (insulated from wholesale
electricity prices) and reduced imports led to a sustained increase in the output of California’s
thermal generation that was much larger than the increase in demand alone (see Figures 5 and
24).
Figure 5
Source: Eric Hildebrandt, “Market Analysis Report,” November 30, 2000.
Similar data showing substantially increased output in 2000 on a unit-by-unit basis have also
been reported by FERC for a subset of these thermal units.
40  In considering the effects of the
aggregate increase in utilization, it should be kept in mind that some units included in the 1999
output data were not operating at all during June 2000 (such as PG&E’s Hunters Point units),
41
increasing the load on the remaining units.
It is also noteworthy in this regard that even with the low import supply elasticity assumed by
Joskow and Kahn, their simulation analysis predicts much lower levels of imports,
42 and thus
                                               
40  FERC Outage Report, pp. 13, 20, 24, 29, 39, 46.
41  It should be noted that PG&E as a large net buyer presumably had a substantial financial incentive to maximize
the output of its thermal units.
42  Joskow-Kahn, pp. 13-14, 37.22
much higher operating levels for thermal generators, than those that prevailed in the real world.
The supply offers in the simulation would likely therefore cause thermal generators to reach their
run time limits even sooner in the simulation than they did in the real world.  If this kind of
simulation approach is to be applied to the California electricity industry, it needs to be applied
over an annual period and the total output in the simulation of each unit subject to environmental
restrictions needs to be compared to and validated against the actual environmental limits.
43
Water Temperature
Duke’s South Bay plant in San Diego is subject to cooling water thermal discharge limits that
can limit output.
44  Mirant’s Contra Costa and Pittsburgh plants are subject to environmental
restrictions, sometimes referred to as the Delta Dispatch.  These restrictions tend to be active
from May through about July 15.  The restrictions predate Mirant’s acquisition of these
generating plants and are intended to protect the Delta Smelt, a fish species in the area.  The
restrictions limit the output and ramp of the Mirant units, with the limits depending on water
temperature in the river.  The full capacity of these units is only available during this period
during local or system emergencies.  None of these limits are taken into account in the
simulations and the Delta restrictions in particular are in effect during the June period.
Non-allowance environmental constraints affecting the output of the thermal units are a
potentially significant factor affecting the supply of energy, and thus California electricity prices,
during the summer of 2000.  If conclusions are to be drawn regarding the exercise of market
power, these limitations need to be taken into account.  If these limitations are not taken into
account, then the analysis cannot distinguish whether high prices are attributable to the exercise
of market power or to the high environmental cost of incremental output.
b)  Price Taking Hydro Power
Like the Borenstein, Bushnell & Wolak and MSC studies, the Joskow-Kahn study takes the
output of hydro resources as given in defining the competitive supply curve and estimating the
competitive market price.
45  Thus, Joskow and Kahn in effect place the output of hydro resources
at the bottom of the supply curve they use to simulate competitive prices.  This methodology,
however, will cause the simulation to understate the actual competitive price level in any hour in
which hydro units were on the margin (i.e., setting prices) in the real world.
46  Information
regarding the frequency of the time that such hydro units were on the margin is apparently not
                                               
43  One way to validate the results of such a simulation against environmental output limits would be to compare
monthly, and cumulative annual output and run times in the simulation to real-world monthly output and run
times from the CEMS data.  Such a comparison needs to be made, however, in the context of a chronological
simulation model that recognizes generator characteristics such as start-up costs, minimum load levels,
minimum down times and minimum run times, as discussed below in Section III.B.2.d.
44  See Comments of Duke Energy North America LLC, November 22, 2000, p. 21.
45  There are, however, important differences in how Joskow and Kahn and the MSC implement this approach,
which are discussed in Section III.C.2 below.
46  This potential for understating the competitive price level is discussed at greater length in Harvey-Hogan, pp.
34-35.23
publicly available, nor is it known to what extent energy-limited hydro (and geothermal)
suppliers used their bids to allocate their energy output to the highest valued hours, but data
reported by the California PX showing that many of the high-price bids in the day-ahead market
during June 2000 were submitted for IOU resources suggest that this may be a material
consideration.
47
There is also no discussion in the Joskow-Kahn paper of how they handled the output of
geothermal units (which are also energy-limited resources and may have used bids to allocate
their energy output to shortage hours).   If Joskow and Kahn followed the BB&W and MSC
methodology, geothermal units would have been treated as price taking as well, which may or
may not accurately characterize their bidding strategy and could also cause the simulation to
understate the competitive price level.
c)  Transmission Congestion
Like BB&W and the MSC, Joskow and Kahn do not attempt to model the impact of transmission
congestion on the cost of meeting California load in a competitive market.  Instead, they
compare the market-clearing price that they estimate, ignoring the effects of congestion, with the
hypothetical unconstrained PX price, which is also calculated without regard to the impact of
transmission congestion.
48  While this approach greatly simplifies the analysis, it has
implications for the conclusions that can be drawn from the Joskow-Kahn analysis.  First, if
transmission congestion were expected to exist in real time, then inter-temporal arbitrage by
generators, in conjunction with the large amount of load often buying energy in the California
real-time market and the segmented structure of California energy and ancillary services
markets, would cause thermal generators lacking market power but located in the constrained-up
regions to submit PX bids that exceed the unconstrained PX price, but instead approximate the
actual zonal PX price and expected real-time zonal price. Thus, if generators in the constrained-
up zone bid the expected real-time market-clearing price for that zone into the day-ahead market
and their costs into the real-time market, the day-ahead zonal price would be equal to the real-
time zonal price in the constrained-up zone.  The hypothetical unconstrained price calculated
from the day-ahead bids, however, could be higher than a hypothetical unconstrained price
                                               
47  See CalPX Compliance Unit, Price Movements in California Electricity Markets, August 31, 2000, p. 11
(hereafter CalPXI), and CalPXII, pp. 55-57. It should be kept in mind that because of the structure of the
California market, one might actually observe much of the generation offered into the PX market at the
expected market-clearing price.  It would then be difficult to determine which units were marginal in a cost
sense and which units are simply bidding to ensure that they are paid the market-clearing price.
Because most of the internal California hydro resources were owned by utilities that were net buyers during the
summer of 2000, one might anticipate that the hydro resource owners would want to avoid submitting bids that
would raise the market-clearing price.  From such a perspective, the ideal course of action might be to allocate
their output to the hours with the highest expected price, bidding it into the market at zero.  To the extent,
however, that pondage hydro or geothermal resources were bid in to provide reserves and the owners sought to
conserve their available energy, the owners would be likely to bid the energy in at high prices, such as
$750/MWh, which would then set the market-clearing price if these resources were dispatched to meet load
during shortage conditions.
48  Joskow and Kahn do not discuss the impact of transmission congestion or RMR contracts on their analysis.
This issue is discussed in BB&W, p. 18.24
calculated from the cost-based real-time bids.  Recall that sellers are not paid the hypothetical
unconstrained price; they are paid the zonal price (or their bid, if dispatched to manage intra-
zonal congestion).  Thus, in a world with perfect competition and perfect foresight, the
unconstrained PX price could exceed the price simulated by Joskow and Kahn in any period in
which the NP-15 or SP-15 price exceeded the unconstrained PX price.
A rough assessment of the potential magnitude of the effect of congestion on the unconstrained
PX price can be made by calculating the average difference between the unconstrained PX price
during June and the price in the constrained-down zone.  This difference averaged $4.37/MWh
over June.
49 This is an upper bound on the impact of the congestion on the calculated
unconstrained price and it is clearly both lower than the total price difference simulated by
Joskow and Kahn and non-trivial.
A second potential effect of congestion relates to intra-zonal congestion.  Until the
implementation of Amendment 26 in early 2000, much intra-zonal congestion was managed
through the call of RMR contracts, after the close of the PX market.  In this non-locational
bidding structure, firms lacking market power but having perfect foresight should be expected to
bid their capacity into the market at the locational market-clearing price.  Firms with locational
market power that is mitigated through RMR contracts would, again with perfect foresight, offer
their capacity into the market in periods with transmission congestion at the lower of the
locational market-clearing price or the mitigated price under their RMR contracts, and would be
called by the ISO out of merit at the RMR contract price to meet real-time load.  Finally, loads
would, with perfect foresight, take these RMR calls into account in bidding into the PX. These
effects are recognized by BB&W who note the potential for RMR contract calls to cause the
actual PX price to be lower than the simulated PX price curve used in their analysis. The same
potential exists in the Joskow-Kahn study.
50
In practice, neither loads nor suppliers have perfect foresight, but they should be expected to bid
so as to attempt to capture the market-clearing price at their location, whether that is the zonal
price or a price reflecting the impact of intra-zonal congestion.
51
Although the Joskow-Kahn, BB&W and MSC papers do not discuss the implications of
prescheduling of RMR generation subsequent to the implementation of Amendment 26, this
system would cause the unconstrained PX supply curve to be lower and to the right of the supply
curve estimated by Joskow-Kahn, BB&W and the MSC.  Like the other impacts of congestion,
the magnitude of the impact of RMR generation on the difference between the actual and
simulated price is variable and hard to quantify without reference to data on actual RMR calls.
While it is possible to use publicly available data to place an upper bound on the effect of
ignoring inter-zonal congestion as discussed above, no publicly available data exist for intra-
zonal congestion or the unit-by-unit level of hourly RMR calls.  As a result, neither the
                                               
49 The difference averaged $13.06 in congested hours.
50  BB&W, p. 29.
51  Moreover, mistakes arising from the imperfect foresight of real-world suppliers would contribute to the market
inefficiency that also raises prices as discussed below.25
magnitude nor the direction of the impact of excluding transmission congestion from the analysis
can be reliably predicted from publicly available data without abandoning the Joskow-Kahn
simulation model and adopting a model that explicitly takes account of transmission congestion.
d)  Start-Up and Minimum-Load Costs
Like BB&W and the MSC, the Joskow-Kahn analysis excludes start-up costs, minimum-load
costs, and operating parameters such as minimum down times and run times
52 in defining the
simulated competitive supply curve and in simulating the estimated market-clearing price.
53  It is
a straightforward result of unit commitment logic that when these costs and restrictions exist, it
will at times be more efficient to meet load with high incremental cost output from a unit that is
already on-line or a high-cost but quick-start unit, than to meet that load by starting a unit with
low incremental energy costs but a long start-up time or high start-up costs.  While taking
account of these costs greatly complicates the analysis, these are real costs that generators must
recover in the market price of energy if they are to operate and that, under a one-part bidding
system such as in California, will be reflected in the bids of competitive generators.
The impact of ignoring start-up and minimum-load costs would very likely be small on days in
which the market was in a shortage situation and prices reached $750/MWh for many hours, but
it could be appreciable over the study period as a whole and even during June on days when
prices were well below the price cap.  For example, in hour 17 on June 17 the unconstrained PX
price was $125, which according to Joskow and Kahn would have exceeded the incremental
running costs of all of the steam units in the CEMS database.
54 The Joskow-Kahn simulation
model would find that all of this generation should therefore have been dispatched to meet load
before the price could rise to $125.  Even if their inferences regarding incremental costs were
correct, however, it is likely that it would not have been economic to use all of the steam
generation to meet load in this hour.  The $125/MWh price was the highest hourly unconstrained
PX price in the day-ahead market for June 17.  While there were six hours that day during which
the unconstrained PX price exceeded $100, it is unlikely that a steam unit with average running
costs of $110 would have expected to recover its start-up costs (or losses from remaining on
overnight at prices that were less than $40 for hours 2 through 8) by operating at prices only
slightly above its running costs for a few hours.  Only a unit with average running costs
materially below $120 would have been economic to bring on-line to meet load during June 17.
It is important to understand that these minimum-load costs can be large and can change the
apparent profitability of unit operation.  For example, Table 6 portrays the apparent profitability
of Alamitos 2 on June 17 (one of the days during which unconstrained PX prices at times
                                               
52   Start-up costs are the fuel costs of bringing a generation unit online to meet load.  In the case of large gas-fired
steam generators, this can be $100,000 or more.  Minimum load costs are the cost of keeping a steam generating
unit operating at its minimum operating level in order to have it available to operate at a higher level later in the
day.
53  BB&W provide various rationales for their failure to take account of start-up and minimum load costs (BB&W,
p. 22), which are discussed in Harvey-Hogan, pp. 14-16 and 38-39.  Joskow and Kahn do not provide any
rationale for their decision not to take account of these costs.
54 Joskow-Kahn,  p.  25.26
exceeded $120/MWh), calculated based on the unconstrained PX price, the actual CEMS
output,
55 the incremental heat rate reported in Klein,
56 and a Southern California gas price of
$4.99 per mmBtu.  These approximate the assumptions apparently used in the various simulation
analyses.  With these assumptions, the unit would appear to earn a margin of nearly $45,573 for
the day, a gross profit margin of nearly 46 percent of its gross revenues.
                                               
55  It should be kept in mind that the CEMS data reports the gross output of each unit. Some of this electricity
output is consumed by the plant itself and therefore does not generate revenues. Tables 6 to 9 below therefore
overstate unit margins because they do not include those costs.
56 Joel  Klein,  “The Use of Heat Rates in Production Cost Modeling and Market Modeling,” April 17, 1998. 10056
is the incremental heat rate at full output.  The incremental heat rate is lower at lower output levels.27
Table 6
Alamitos 2 Profitability























0 10056 10 50.00 50.18 -0.18 -1.79
1 10056 9 38.99 50.18 -11.19 -100.71
2 10056 9 35.76 50.18 -14.42 -129.78
3 10056 9 35.75 50.18 -14.43 -129.87
4 10056 9 35.01 50.18 -15.17 -136.53
5 10056 29 28.01 50.18 -22.17 -642.91
6 10056 37 32.00 50.18 -18.18 -672.64
7 10056 25 37.90 50.18 -12.28 -306.99
8 10056 34 45.01 50.18 -5.17 -175.76
9 10056 53 72.57 50.18 22.39 1186.70
10 10056 56 76.52 50.18 26.34 1475.07
11 10056 56 90.00 50.18 39.82 2229.95
12 10056 57 105.00 50.18 54.82 3124.77
13 10056 94 116.13 50.18 65.95 6199.35
14 10056 122 115.00 50.18 64.82 7908.11
15 10056 124 119.98 50.18 69.80 8655.27
16 10056 107 125.00 50.18 74.82 8005.80
17 10056 63 115.00 50.18 64.82 4083.70
18 10056 38 93.92 50.18 43.74 1662.14
19 10056 34 80.01 50.18 29.83 1014.24
20 10056 48 80.01 50.18 29.83 1431.87
21 10056 19 75.61 50.18 25.43 483.18
22 10056 24 65.00 50.18 14.82 355.69
23 10056 15 53.76 50.18 3.58 53.71
Total All Hours 45572.59
Total Profitable Hours 47869.55
No allowance is made for variable O&M, emission allowance or station costs.





(D)  (A) * $4.99/1000
(E)  (C) – (D)
(F)  (E) * (B)
However, the assumptions of the simulation analyses simplify the problem in important ways.
By contrast, Table 7 recalculates the profitability of Alamitos 2 using the actual average heat rate
reported in the CEMS data for each hour and the SP-15 PX price.  Rather than earning a
significant profit, it can be seen that the unit would have lost money had it sold its real-time28
output in the PX market.
57  Part of the difference is attributable to the difference between the
actual SP-15 price and the hypothetical unconstrained price, but most of the difference is
attributable to the fact that the unit’s actual average heat rate was much higher than the
incremental heat rate reported in Klein for most of the hours of the day.  The unit’s output
weighted average heat rate was almost 17,000, compared to the incremental heat rate of 10,056
in Klein.
                                               
57  It should be kept in mind that these tables do not reflect the actual day-ahead revenues of the unit.  Profits are
calculated in these tables based on real-time output and day-ahead prices.  The actual day-ahead schedule of the
unit is not known.  The tables also do not include any ancillary service revenues that the unit might have earned
in the day-ahead or real-time markets.29
Table 7























0 33832.31 10 35.00 168.82 -133.82 -1338.23
1 36213.68 9 30.00 180.71 -150.71 -1356.36
2 36480.34 9 24.02 182.04 -158.02 -1422.15
3 35558.12 9 20.51 177.44 -156.92 -1412.33
4 36258.12 9 19.99 180.93 -160.94 -1448.44
5 20490.45 29 15.00 102.25 -87.25 -2530.17
6 17751.98 37 24.99 88.58 -63.59 -2352.92
7 20660.92 25 22.90 103.10 -80.20 -2004.95
8 18735.97 34 32.02 93.49 -61.47 -2090.07
9 16404.21 53 38.01 81.86 -43.85 -2323.89
10 15736.13 56 70.00 78.52 -8.52 -477.30
11 15666.48 56 74.23 78.18 -3.95 -220.96
12 15810.93 57 82.00 78.90 3.10 176.90
13 14684.29 94 101.13 73.27 27.86 2618.41
14 14206.75 122 113.60 70.89 42.71 5210.42
15 14204.22 124 119.98 70.88 49.10 6088.52
16 14272.18 107 123.60 71.22 52.38 5604.86
17 15224.18 63 113.60 75.97 37.63 2370.78
18 16774.29 38 85.00 83.70 1.30 49.26
19 18068.33 34 75.00 90.16 -15.16 -515.47
20 16900.48 48 74.99 84.33 -9.34 -448.48
21 22101.21 19 52.00 110.29 -58.29 -1107.42
22 22146.79 24 51.30 110.51 -59.21 -1421.10
23 25961.54 15 38.01 129.55 -91.54 -1373.07
Total All Hours 1081 -1724.19
Total Profitable Hours 22119.12
No allowance is made for variable O&M, emission allowance or station costs.
Gas Price = 4.99
Sources:
(A),  (B). CEMS
(C)   PX
(D)  (A)  * $4.99/1000
(E) (C)  – (D)
(F) (E)  *  (B)
While incremental heat rates are appropriate for calculating incremental dispatch costs, they are
not appropriate for evaluating unit commitment decisions.  The unit commitment decision must
take into account the average heat rate and costs of a unit, as well as its incremental costs.
Bidding strategy is greatly complicated for California generators by the CAISO and PX reliance
on one-part bids, but the decision to prevent generators from submitting multi-part bids does not
change the underlying economics that will govern the bids of competitive generators.  Generators30
in competitive markets will submit one-part bids that limit the financial losses arising from
uneconomic PX positions.  This will entail submitting one-part bids that exceed incremental
costs on potentially marginal or extra-marginal units.
The Joskow-Kahn methodology not only likely understates the bid price at which capacity that
actually operated in the real-world would be offered to the day-ahead market (because this
capacity would lose money on marginal operations in the Joskow-Kahn model) but also likely
assumes that capacity that did not operate in the real world because of high start-up and
minimum-load costs, would have operated in many additional hours in which the units would
have lost money.  The Joskow-Kahn simulation methodology implicitly assumes that a steam
unit would be available to meet load at incremental cost in each and every hour, even if it was
only needed to meet load for a single hour and that the units could be turned off whenever prices
made their operation uneconomic, even for a single hour.
Load could indeed be met more cheaply if start-up and minimum-load costs did not exist and
units did not have inflexible operating characteristics, but real generators dispatched to meet
California load did incur start-up and minimum-load costs and did have operating constraints.
These costs and operating constraints raise the cost of meeting load in a competitive market.  The
effect of these assumptions can also be illustrated using the actual output of Alamitos 2 on June
17.  It can be seen in Table 8 that even if average heat rates are used to evaluate operating
profitability, the operation of Alamitos 2 appears highly profitable if it is modeled as being able
to turn on whenever prices are high and turn off whenever prices are low.  Thus, with this
flexibility, it would appear highly profitable to use Alamitos to meet load on June 17, earning
$22,119, when in fact the day-ahead prices for energy alone were not high enough to justify
operation of Alamitos 2 at the levels to which it was actually dispatched.
Thus, if Alamitos 2 were not providing ancillary services and submitted cost-based energy bids
reflecting the CEMS heat rate data and the Joskow-Kahn fuel price assumptions to a centralized
day-ahead unit commitment process such as those coordinated by the PJM-ISO and NYISO,
Alamitos 2 would not have been committed to meet these schedules at these prices because
operation of the unit would not have been economic.  In the real world, even price-taking
competitive suppliers should bid their units into the CAP PX and ISO markets so as to recover
their variable operating costs.  The Joskow-Kahn simulation model would commit Alamitos 2
and other units to operate in circumstances in which it is not efficient for the plant to run and it











Profitable Hours 22119 3744
All Hours -1724 -29080
Incremental Heat Rate
Profitable Hours 40723 47870 19449
All Hours 35537 45573 8180
Calculations do not include variable O&M, emission allowances or station costs.
Since the Joskow-Kahn simulation results, like those of the BB&W and the MSC, take no
account of start-up and minimum load costs, the impact of minimum-load and start-up costs and
operating constraints would show up in the Joskow-Kahn study as indistinguishable from
anticompetitive withholding.
The impact of these implicit assumptions regarding minimum-load costs and operating
constraints is potentially magnified by the increase in emission allowance costs during 2000.  If
emissions are a function of energy inputs, total daily emissions per MW will be higher than
implied by incremental heat rates alone and these costs will be much higher per MW during the
hours with poorer heat rate performance.  Table 9 illustrates this impact for Alamitos 2 on June
17, using the CEMS emission rate for 1Q 2000 and an assumed NOx allowance price of $10/lb.
It can be seen that the operation of Alamitos 2 would have been dramatically unprofitable at day-
ahead PX prices on this day, losing slightly more than $33/MWh.
58  At the same time, a
calculation based on incremental heat rates, and assuming that the unit would have operated only
during the hours in which it was profitable, would imply profits of $28/MWh.
59
                                               
58 -$36,382/1081  MWh.
59 $30,574/1081  MWh.32
Table 9
Alamitos 2 Profitability June 17,2000
With and Without Emissions Allowance Costs










Rate -1724 -36382 22119 5299
Incremental
Heat Rate 45573 25027 47870 30574
Emission rate .189 pounds per mmBtu per CEMS.
Assumed allowance costs $10/pound.
Calculated profitability does not include variable O&M or station costs.
These calculations for Alamitos 2 are only illustrative and we have not repeated this calculation
for every unit for every day of June.  The point of these calculations is that the financial impact
of minimum load costs and operating inflexibilities is not necessarily insignificant.  Simulation
models that implicitly or explicitly make unit commitment decisions without regard to these
costs have the potential to misstate the competitive level of electricity prices.
A failure to include either start-up and minimum-load costs or operating parameters in
simulation models will also hinder the ability of these models to accurately account for the
environmental constraints discussed above.  In simulations lacking these costs and constraints,
environmental constraints would be less limiting because units subject to such limits could be
dispatched only in high-priced hours, conserving their hours on-line or operating factor.  In the
real world, however, some of the units subject to these environmental limits were steam units
with start-up times, minimum-load levels and minimum down times.  They could not be simply
turned on and off hour by hour as needed, and having them available to meet load in high-priced
hours could entail running them and using up limited operating time or output in other lower-
price hours.  These effects would be entirely missing in non-chronological simulation models
that do not account for these kinds of constraints.
Simple non-chronological models that do not account for start-up and no-load costs cannot
accurately simulate the competitive level of prices.  As illustrated above, this is not a detail.  It
can be a fundamental limitation.  A better alternative would be to assume that market participants
were able to replicate the results of a centralized unit commitment process through their
individual one-part bids and self-commitment and thus to estimate market prices based on the
estimated multi-part cost functions of the various generators.
60  This method of simulating
                                               
60  Simulation models such as GE MAPS could do this, as well as taking account of transmission constraints.33
market prices would still be biased toward finding market power, because it would tend to
attribute to market power the inefficiency arising from the California market design,
61 but the
estimates would be less biased than those provided by a methodology which simply assumes that
start-up and no-load costs and other operating inflexibilities are not material.
62
e)  Outage Assumptions
Like the BB&W and MSC analyses, the Joskow-Kahn study bases its simulation on assumed
outage rates rather than actual outage data for the period studied.  The Joskow-Kahn
methodology for taking account of forced outages differs, however, from that of BB&W and the
MSC.  It assumes that all California generators (both fossil and must-take) suffer outages in each
period in proportion to the forced outage rate in the Henwood database.
63  Like the methodology
in the BB&W and MSC studies, this approach will overstate the available generation to the
extent that the actual outage rate differed from that in the Henwood database, either due to
fortuitous events or due to hard use.
64  The methodology therefore cannot distinguish between
high prices due to the exercise of market power or to higher than assumed outage rates.
Moreover, it would be inappropriate to assume that increased levels of forced outages necessarily
reflect the exercise of market power.  For example, AES encountered substantially higher outage
rates on all of its units during 2000 than in 1998 or 1999,
65 yet AES had sold its output forward
and did not benefit from higher prices.
66  Indeed, AES lost money in California during 2000.
67
Similarly, the summer-long outage of PG&E’s Hunters Point units 2 and 3 and the outage of
Hunters Point 4 during May and June presumably raised prices in the real world relative to the
prices simulated by Joskow and Kahn and this effect would be included in the price difference
they attribute to market power but, as a substantial net buyer, PG&E presumably had no
incentive to withdraw output from the market to raise prices.
68
                                               
61  See the discussion in Harvey-Hogan, pp. 8-14, 31-34, and item 6 below.
62  While it is more difficult to model the electric industry if account is taken of start-up and minimum-load costs,
these costs are sufficiently important that the standard industry simulation tools take them into account.  GE-
MAPS, for example, could be used to simulate unit commitment and prices taking account of start-up and no-
load costs.  Since MAPS also models the transmission system, this approach would also have enabled
simulation of the effect of locational constraints and RMR calls, modeling of reserve requirements, and
evaluation of environmental output limits.
63 Joskow-Kahn,  p.  14.
64  Thermal generators in California operated at higher levels than in previous years throughout the period May
through December, so historical outage rates may be not accurate for 2000 operating conditions (see Figure 5
above and Figure 24 below).
65  Stu Ryan, AES Pacific, February 1, 2001, Analyst Presentation (hereafter Ryan).
66  A further complication, not addressed here, would be the full analysis of the forward contracting position of the
thermal generators, which could affect their incentives for strategic withholding.
67  AES January 29, 2001, Press Release re annual earnings. Aesc.com/investor/press/index.html
68  Joskow and Kahn state that they relied on the commercially available Henwood database for capacities (p. 14)
but it is not entirely clear which units were included from the database.  In particular, it is not clear whether the
capacities of units owned by entities other than the five large non-utility generators (AES, Duke, Dynegy/NRG,
Mirant and Reliant) that were not available in June 2000( such as 377 MW of PG&E’s Hunters Point steam34
In addition, by smoothing the incidence of outages over time, the Joskow-Kahn approach to
outage modeling introduces a new problem not found in the BB&W or MSC studies.
69  The
Joskow-Kahn approach of proportionally derating every unit in every hour is easy to implement
but has the limitation that to the extent that real-world outages of either fossil generation or must-
take generation were lumpy, this methodology would tend to reduce the number of shortage
hours by smoothing out the impact of outages.
70 This limitation of the Joskow-Kahn
methodology can be illustrated with a simple example.  Suppose that there were two 1,000 MW
units in the market with a 5 percent outage probability.  The Joskow-Kahn methodology would
assume that the units would provide 1,900 MW of capacity with a probability equal to one, while
in the real world there would be a 90.25 percent probability of having 2,000 MW of capacity, a
9.5 percent probability of having 1,000 MW of capacity and a .25 percent probability of having
no capacity.  Obviously, if load exceeds 1,000 MW, shortages would be much less likely if
outages occurred in the manner assumed by Joskow and Kahn than they would be in the real
world.  If real-world units suffered outages in the smooth predictable manner assumed by the
Joskow-Kahn model, less available capacity would be needed to meet load, supply would be
larger relative to demand and prices would be lower.  Such an assumption can obscure the
reasons for high prices in California and the distinction between competitive behavior and the
exercise of market power, because real-world units do not suffer outages in this nice, smooth
predictable manner.
The actual impact of the Joskow-Kahn assumptions regarding outage rates and incidence are
difficult to assess without knowing the actual pattern of real-world outages.  Data showing
atypically high outage rates for AES units in the summer of 2000
71 and knowledge of PG&E’s
Hunter Point outages, in combination with the information in the FERC Outage Report, however,
suggest that understatement of real-world forced outage rates have depressed the simulated
competitive prices in the Joskow-Kahn study.
                                                                                                                                                      
units and the 140 MW of  Thermo-Ecotek’s Riverside units) were treated as available in the simulation.  We
have confirmed that the Hunters Point units were treated as available in the simulation, which would tend to
cause the simulation to understate the competitive price.
69  BB&W and the MSC went to great lengths to avoid this potential source of bias, using actual output data for
must-take and geothermal generation and using Monte-Carlo simulation methods to account for the impact of
random forced outages of thermal units on prices, see BB&W, pp. 28, 41-43.
70  We have confirmed that the unit capacities used by Joskow and Kahn in the simulation analysis were  net output
capacities (i.e., net of the electricity output consumed by the generating unit).
71 See  Ryan.35
f)  Inefficiency of California Market Structure
The California electricity markets have a number of design features that predictably cause
suppliers entirely lacking market power to bid their resources into the market at the expected
market-clearing price rather than at their costs.
72 In addition, the one-part bidding mechanism
requires that market participants make guesses about market-clearing prices in order to determine
the offer price of potentially extra-marginal units with start-up or minimum-load costs.
73  Even if
these guesses do not change the identity of the resources used to meet load, errors in predicting
the market-clearing price could raise the prices paid by loads (if generators guess that the
market-clearing price will be higher that it actually turns out to be) or could reduce the prices
paid by loads (if generators guess that the market-clearing price will be lower than it actually
turns out to be).  If there were no change in the actual resource cost of meeting load, the errors
might cancel out and have no impact on market efficiency or real-world market prices.
In practice, however, it is unlikely in our view that load will be met at least cost in markets that
clear based on generators guessing the market-clearing price.  Instead, it is likely that some of the
generators that overestimate the market-clearing price would be lower cost than some of the
generators whose bids clear in the market.  In this circumstance, the bidding errors attributable to
non-uniform pricing would not cancel out, because the guesses would change the resources used
to meet load and the supply curve would in effect be shifted in as a result of some supply
resources not clearing in the market despite being infra-marginal on a cost basis.
The inefficiency of the California market might also exacerbate the impact of the annual run time
and capacity factor limits by making it more difficult for California generators to bid their units
into the market to provide reserves but with sufficiently high energy bids that the units would
rarely be dispatched for energy.  The lack of cooptimization of the energy and reserve markets,
the pay-as-bid structure of the ancillary services market arising from the rational buyer protocol,
and the non-least-cost dispatch of reserves and other energy to meet load in real time create a
market structure in which energy-limited resources may not be efficiently allocated between
reserves and energy.  This effect would potentially be exacerbated by the lowering of the price
caps in July and August, which would cause many suppliers to offer energy at the price cap,
increasing the likelihood that generators trying to ration their hours of operation would be
dispatched for energy if they offered their capacity in the market.  These kinds of inefficiency in
the California market structure have been long recognized, but their costs may have been
magnified by the energy shortage created by low hydro conditions and hot weather in the west.
The design of the California market was premised on there being other advantages that
compensate for this inefficiency in the short-term market.  Even if that is the case, however, the
inefficiency of the short-term market must be taken into account in empirical analyses of market
performance.  While reasonable people may disagree over the magnitude of the short-run
inefficiency arising from the non-uniform, pay-as-bid pricing elements of the California market
design, simulations of competitive prices intended to identify the exercise of market power must
                                               
72  These features, as well as evidence of the inefficiency to which they lead, are discussed in Harvey-Hogan, pp.
6-14.
73  See Harvey-Hogan, pp. 14-16, 38-39.36
recognize that this inefficiency exists and account for it in the analysis.  Like BBW and the
MSC, the Joskow-Kahn analysis of supply, in effect, simulates the market-clearing prices that
would arise under a centralized market-clearing process for energy and ancillary services, rather
than simulating likely competitive outcomes under the actual California market structure.
The quantitative impact of the inefficiency introduced by the California market design is hard to
assess.  Indeed, it is not apparent that there is any simple, reliable method of assessing the impact
of this inefficiency.
74 It should be apparent, however, that it is not appropriate to simply attribute
to the exercise of market power all differences between the price levels that might prevail in
centrally coordinated day-ahead and real-time markets
75 and the price levels prevailing under the
California market design.
3.     New Problems
While the Joskow-Kahn study improves on some areas of the BB&W and MSC studies, there are
also two areas (the method of measuring load and the method of determining hydro output) in
which the methodology and data employed in the Joskow-Kahn study could introduce new
problems.
76  The method of measuring load is likely to cause the simulation to understate the
competitive price level while the impact of the hydro methodology cannot be determined without
access to data on actual hydro output in high-load hours.
a)   Monthly Load Aggregation
The Joskow-Kahn simulation analyzes supply and demand for monthly rather than hourly
periods, and analyzes load within each month by deciles.
77  This approach tends to understate the
impact of peak load demand on prices and is likely to understate the number of shortage hours.
One source of the bias from this approach is that monthly load is highly variable, and there is
considerable variation in loads within the top decile of load hours.  Thus, as seen in Figures 10,
11 and 12, the actual loads in the top decile exceeded the average load for the decile in June by
1,000 MW or more in 18 of the 72 hours, in July for 19 of the 74 hours, and in August for 12 of
                                               
74  One might attempt to develop measures of market inefficiency from data on the frequency of irrational price
patterns in PX and CAISO markets that might be compared to similar statistics for PJM and NY.  Even with
such measures, however, it is doubtful whether there is a reliable criteria for translating indicators or relative
market efficiency into price impacts.
75  Such as those coordinated by the PJM ISO and NY ISO.
76  An additional methodological issue that is probably not material in June and July, but may be more important in
the August through December 2000 period (with increased gas price volatility), is the use of monthly average
gas prices rather than daily gas prices.  If gas prices are correlated with the amount of gas-fired generation
running, and thus with the heat rate of the marginal unit, the use of monthly averages may cause simulation
results to understate the competitive level of electricity prices.
77  Joskow-Kahn, p. 12. Joskow-Kahn state that they take this approach because they lack access to publicly
available hourly data on hydro power production inside California.  It is not apparent, however, how averaging
loads in this manner reduces the error associated with their procedures for modeling hydro power.  It appears,
on the contrary, that this procedure serves only to introduce error into the demand measures used in their
simulation, in addition to the potentially poor measurement of hydro supply.37
the 74 hours.  Using the average decile load rather than actual loads in the Joskow-Kahn
simulation therefore materially understates load in many of the high-priced hours.  This
understating of load in the highest price periods has the potential to materially understate the
simulated prices in these hours, especially by eliminating shortage hours.
Figure 10





















Mean of Top Decile = 40,996 MW
If the relationship between prices and loads were linear (i.e., a 500 MW increase in loads
resulted in an X dollar increase in prices at all points along the supply curve), then this averaging
of loads would not affect the average prices simulated by the study, as if loads were 500 MW
higher than the monthly average in some hours and 500 MW lower than the monthly average in
other hours, the prices would also be correspondingly higher and lower and the simulated
average monthly price would not be affected by the intra-month variation in loads.38
Figure 11


















Mean of Top Decile = 39,996 MW
The relationship between loads and prices in a competitive California electricity market should,
however, be expected to be non-linear for two reasons.
78  First, as capacity is exhausted, the
running and opportunity costs of the marginal units probably rise much more rapidly than load.
Second, the system is much more likely to be in a state of shortage, with prices rising to the price
cap in very high load conditions.
                                               
78  BB&W also assume such a convex relationship, BB&W p. 20.39
Figure 12





















Mean of top Decile = 41,379 MW
In these circumstances, the load averaging procedure of Joskow and Kahn is likely to reduce the
number of hours that the simulated market clears on the very steep portion of the supply curve or
that the price rises to the price cap as a result of the market failing to clear in a shortage.
Because the actual competitive market price rises more when load is above average within the
highest decile than it falls when load is below average in this decile, the use of deciles, rather
than hour-by-hour data, to simulate competitive prices tends to bias the simulated price
downward, relative to actual average prices, as illustrated in Figure 13.  P1 is the average of the
prices when load is low and high, while P2 is the price corresponding to the average load.  If the













A related issue is how the Joskow-Kahn study treated shortage hours.  There is no discussion in
Joskow-Kahn of how prices were determined in hours in which the simulated market failed to
clear, a topic that was explicitly discussed in BB&W.
79  Having accounted for ancillary services
demand equal to 10 percent of load, one would expect that the Joskow-Kahn study would have
identified many more hours of shortage than did BB&W or the MSC.
80  The implication of this
lack of discussion of shortage hours is that the Joskow-Kahn procedure for estimating peak
loads, perhaps in combination with the assumptions regarding hydro power availability discussed
below, eliminated shortage hours in the simulation of June prices.  If this is the case, it may not
be surprising that the Joskow-Kahn simulation would fail to replicate real-world prices since
shortage conditions appear to have driven most of the high priced hours during June.
81
b)  Hydro and Geothermal Power Allocation
Joskow and Kahn apparently allocate monthly hydro power equal to 60 percent of the historical
monthly hourly average supply to each hour in the month, and then allocate the rest to the high-
                                               
79  BB&W, p. 21.
80  The BB&W and MSC analysis of demand did not take account of the capacity required to provide reserves,
BB&W, p. 19 and Harvey-Hogan, pp. 30-31.
81  See Harvey-Hogan, pp. 16 to 25, for a discussion of the relationship between high prices and shortage
conditions during June.  A California ISO Department of Market Analysis Study, “Report on California Energy
Market Issues and Performance:  May-June 2000,” August 10, 2000, argues that many of the high-priced hours
did not reflect shortages (pp. 47-51). This analysis, however, is not based on actual real-world unit availability,
but assumes no thermal units were derated, no outages of thermal units occurred during these days, and that any
units that came on-line were immediately available at full output.41
priced hours, up to 8,000 MW.
82 This procedure allocates 8,000 MW of hydro power to the top
four load decile hours, and 3,155 MW to the lowest five decile hours.
83  If the full 8,000 MW of
hydro capacity were not actually available in all of the high-priced hours, the Joskow-Kahn
methodology would overstate the capacity available in the peak hours in which prices were high,
eliminating shortage hours and downward biasing simulated prices in these hours.
84
Like the load aggregation procedure discussed above, the potential impact of the hydro power
allocation rule on the results of the price simulation arises from the non-linear impact on prices
of supply reductions when the market is tight.  The hydro power allocation rule would not make
much difference if the supply curve had a constant slope over its entire length.  In this situation,
an increase in load of 1,000 MW would have the same impact on price whether it happened on a
high-load hour or a low-load hour and, similarly, a change in hydro power supply would have the
same impact on price if it happened on a high-load hour or a low-load hour.  If, on the other
hand, the supply curve becomes increasingly steep at high-load levels and eventually becomes
nearly vertical, then these assumptions could cause the simulation to materially understate the
competitive level of prices.  It cannot be determined whether the Joskow-Kahn hydro power
assumption causes their simulation results to overstate or understate the competitive price level
without analyzing the actual pattern of hydro power availability, but the impact could be
material.
85
Although not explicitly described in the paper, we have confirmed with the authors that  unlike
the MSC and BB&W analyses, the Joskow-Kahn study did not impose limits on the energy
output of California geothermal units.  This is also a potentially significant assumption whose
impact cannot be evaluated without comparing the simulated output with the actual output of the
geothermal units.  It is noteworthy, however, that the California ISO’s recent CAISO 2001
Summer Assessment specifically mentioned the impact of declining steam field pressure on the
dependable output of geothermal capacity.
86
While assumptions like these might be appropriate in a demonstration that it is conceivable that
there could have been economic withholding, a study based on such assumptions cannot provide
an indication that output withholding by thermal generators occurred because it cannot
                                               
82  The BB&W and MSC studies made use of confidential hour-by-hour data on actual hydro and geothermal
output that was not available to Joskow-Kahn.
83 Joskow-Kahn,  p.  38.
84  The potential for overstated hydro capacity arises not only from the possibility that the 8,000 MW capacity
figure might be high for peak availability but also from the possibility that the number of hours per day that this
peak capacity was available was more limited than implied by the non-chronological modeling of supply and
demand in the Joskow-Kahn model.  The actual hydro generation data apparently utilized by BB&W and the
MSC would not only better account for total hydro capacity, but would also better account for limitations on
hydro power availability both within a day and over a multi-day hot spell.
85  Joskow-Kahn maintain that the assumptions are conservative but no basis is provided for this view (Joskow-
Kahn, pp. 12-13).
86 California  ISO,  “CAISO 2001 Summer Assessment,” March 22, 2001; “declining steam field pressure has
affected the power output of geothermal units within the CAISO Control Area, thereby reducing the overall
maximum “Dependable generating capability,” p. 5.  A similar comment is repeated on page 16.  The
assessment also refers to the “reduced capacity levels of geothermal resources,” p. 842
distinguish economic withholding from incorrect assumptions regarding the level of hydro  and
geothermal output in high-priced hours.
4.  Conclusions
While the Joskow-Kahn simulation study improves on the BB&W and MSC studies in its
treatment of NOx allowance costs and ancillary services requirements, it confronts many of the
same limitations of the earlier studies.  Particularly important in this regard are likely to be the
Joskow-Kahn study’s treatment of environmental restrictions other than NOx allowance costs,
hydro power offer prices, start-up and minimum-load costs, and outage assumptions.  In
addition, the treatment of load, hydro and geothermal power availability and outage probabilities
create sources of imprecision not present in the BB&W and MSC studies.
Overall, the simulation results do not provide evidence that the high prices in California have
been attributable to economic withholding.  While the study shows that California prices have
been higher than they might have been in a world without environmental output limitations,
start-up and minimum load costs of thermal generation, energy limitations on hydro and
geothermal output and with outage and load patterns matching those assumed in the study, the
difference cannot be attributed to market power, as it might be attributable to some or all of these
other differences between the simulation and actual power markets.
C.  Withholding Analysis
1.  Overview
A pathbreaking contribution of the Joskow-Kahn analysis is the use of CEMS data to attempt to
test whether available thermal generating capacity was withheld from the real-time market
during high-priced hours in June 2000.  The CEMS data compiled by the EPA portrays the hour-
by-hour gross output of the covered thermal units.
87
Joskow and Kahn study the hours in June for which the PX day-ahead price exceeded $120 and
compare the actual output of the units studied to the estimated capacity of these units.  The
analysis posits that any difference between actual and potential output can be attributed only to:
1) capacity used to meet ancillary service requirements; 2) capacity out of service due to forced
outages; 3) capacity not available due to inter-zonal transmission constraints; and 4) economic or
physical withholding.  Joskow and Kahn therefore seek to account for the impact of the first
three factors, with any unexplained difference between output and capacity being attributed to
withholding and other factors.
88
This gap or difference between the energy output of a unit and the maximum capacity becomes
the focus for examining the possibility of strategic withholding.  The extra capacity could be
                                               
87 http://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/reporting/edr21/edrinst.june00.pdf,
http://www.epa.gov/ardpublic/acidrain/ftp/rawhles.html.
88 Joskow-Kahn,  p.  23.43
used to supply other services, such as reserves, or result from factors that limit the ability of
generators to produce their full output.  The gap could also reflect intentional withholding of
supply in order to influence market prices.  Hence, the size of the gap and the likely magnitudes
of these various contributing factors become important in determining the strength of the
evidence for any particular interpretation.
This gap analysis faces many of the complications described above for the simulation studies.
For example, limitations on ramping of generators could contribute to the gap, but the magnitude
is difficult to estimate without detailed dispatch data. Here we examine the analysis as best we
can with the available data to indicate the sensitivity of the results and the likely order of
magnitude of the potential errors of estimation.
Joskow and Kahn find that the difference between the output and capacity of the plants they
study is less than the ISO’s ancillary service requirements in NP-15 and greater than the ISO’s
ancillary service requirements in SP-15.
89  They further attempt to allow for the impact of forced
outages by excluding the capacity of units not operating in the hour, day or prior day from the
calculation of the output gap.  If the output gap is calculated based on the output of units
operating in a given hour, they find a mean output gap of 690 MW in NP-15 compared to total
ancillary service requirements of 1,510 MW, and a mean output gap of 1,954 MW in SP-15,
compared to total ancillary service requirements of 1,672 MW.
90  For SP-15 they also compare
the estimated output gap to ancillary service requirements and find 49 hours in which there is no
congestion from SP-15 to NP-15 in which the estimated output gap in SP-15 exceeds the
estimated ancillary service requirements by 500 MW or more, using the best of their measures of
the impact of forced outages.
91  Joskow and Kahn then repeat their calculation of the output gap
for June using the WSCC EHV data, finding a smaller output gap in NP-15 and a larger output
gap in SP15 than in their analysis based on EPA data.  They attribute the larger output gap in SP-
15 to the inclusion of additional generation capacity.
92  This analysis does not, however, include
any adjustment for the impact of unit outages.  Joskow and Kahn then use the EHV data to
extend their analysis of the output gap through September, but without any adjustment to
available capacity for the impact of unit outages.  They again find a large output gap in SP-15,
which they caveat by noting that the gap probably includes a fairly large amount of capacity
whose operation was not economic under the price cap during August and September, and that
there is no allowance for the impact of forced outages.
93  Joskow and Kahn conclude that despite
these limitations, their analysis reveals unexplained output gaps that are “sufficiently large to
suggest that power supplies were withheld in the zone during the June through September
period.”
94
                                               
89  Joskow-Kahn, Table 8, p. 26.
90  Joskow-Kahn, pp. 25-30.
91  Joskow-Kahn, Table 11, p. 30.
92  Joskow-Kahn, Table 12, p. 31.
93  Joskow-Kahn, pp. 31-33.
94 Joskow-Kahn,  p.  33.44
The Joskow-Kahn analysis is a thoughtful effort to quantitatively assess a difficult public policy
question.  Nevertheless, the analysis has a number of acknowledged and unacknowledged data
and methodological limitations, most of which tend to overstate the capacity available to meet
load in these high-priced hours or to otherwise overstate the output gap.  These limitations
include:  basing the comparison on hours in which day-ahead, rather than real-time prices, were
high, omission of partial unit outages or environmental output limitations; incomplete accounting
for ancillary service demand; omission of start-up and minimum load costs; assuming equality
between peak hourly demand and average hourly demand; inability to account for the impact of
the CAISO’s dispatch instructions; potentially overstated unit capacities; an assumption that
cumulative annual output limitations were not binding; and assuming that market inefficiency
had no impact on available supply.  In addition, our replication of their work identified a few
data problems.
2.  Day-Ahead Prices and Real-Time Output
Joskow and Kahn identify the high priced hours in which they study withholding based on the
day-ahead unconstrained PX price.  In June the threshold they use for a high-priced hour is a
day-ahead price of $120, $90 in July, $130 in August and $110 in September.  Importantly,
Joskow and Kahn select the hours they analyze based on high day-ahead PX prices, but then test
for withholding based on real-time output.  This tends to bias the study towards finding evidence
of withholding, even if none existed because the real-time output of a competitive firm depends
on real-time prices, not just day-ahead prices.  Even if output is sold forward at day-ahead prices,
this is only a financial commitment.  The ultimate opportunity cost for real-time production is the
real-time price that would apply to any differences between day-ahead schedules and actual
production.
In particular, the selection of high-priced hours restricts attention to the supply region where
Joskow and Kahn presume that competitively offered plants would all be at their maximum
output.  Higher real-time prices should not produce higher output, but lower real-time prices
could result in lower output.  The effects do not average out.  Therefore, with any significant
volatility in real-time prices relative to day-ahead prices, this asymmetry would tend to overstate
the implied withholding of supply.
The day-ahead prices used in the Joskow-Kahn study were determined in the PX and reflected
day-ahead supply and demand conditions.  The day-ahead prices are related to real-time prices
because day-ahead demand and supply offers will be affected by expected real-time demand,
supply and prices.  Nevertheless, it needs to be recognized in empirical analysis that actual real-
time prices will often differ from expected real-time prices.  In particular, day-ahead prices are
sometimes high in expectation of high loads that fail to materialize in real time.  When this
occurs and real-time load is lower than anticipated, real-time utilization and prices will also be
reduced.45
Examples of such unfulfilled expectations can be seen on June 16, 23 and 30 in the DMA report
on May-June 2000, and for a number of hours on June 15.
95  Because the Joskow-Kahn
methodology is based on day-ahead prices and real-time output, it treats output reductions
associated with real-time load and price declines as anticompetitive withholding, when it could
reflect an efficient and competitive response to lower demand and prices.
In order to assess the impact of the Joskow-Kahn study’s reliance on day-ahead, rather than real-
time prices, the Joskow-Kahn withholding analysis has been replicated for the companies and
units whose output was analyzed by Joskow and Kahn.  First, Joskow and Kahn’s finding that
the output gap for these units averaged 983 MW in the North and 3,351 MW in the South  in the
137 June hours in which the PX day-ahead price was $120/MWh or more was largely replicated.
The results of this replication are portrayed in Table 14.  One difference that should be noted as
it will affect some of the discussion that follows is that the generators labeled by Joskow and
Kahn as NP-15 generators are actually located in three zones:  NP-15, Z-26 and SF, as noted on
Table 14.  This difference is important later, as their analysis of ancillary service supply did not
include the CAISO data for the SF and Z-26 zones, although their calculation of an output gap
included generators in these zones.  In order to maintain consistency with the Joskow-Kahn
calculations and facilitate comparisons, Z-26 is treated below as if it is part of NP-15, which is
not accurate.
                                               
95  California ISO, Department of Market Analysis, “Report on California Energy Market Issues and Performance:
May-June 2000,” August 10, 2000,  p. 13.46
Table 14
Output Gap (MW), Not Adjusted for Outages





















NP-15, SF and Z-26
Duke 2,563 2,422 141 2,563 2,422 141
Southern 2,932 2,090 842 2,932 2,090 842
Total 5,495 4,512 983 5,495 4,512 983
SF and Humboldt
PG&E NA NA NA 279 93 186
SP-15 (excluding Z-26)
AES 3,681 2,542 1,139 3,681 2,542 1,139
Duke 733 643 90 733 643 90
Dynegy 2,000 1,014 986 2,000 1,014 986
Reliant 3,487 2,351 1,136 3,487 2,351 1,136
Total 9,901 6,550 3,351 9,901 6,550 3,351
Source:
(A) – (C): Joskow-Kahn, Table 8
(D) – (E): CEMS Data
(F): Col. (D) – Col. (E)
Table 14 also differs from the figures reported by Joskow and Kahn in that it includes a similarly
calculated output gap for PG&E, which continued to own two plants in the north during the
study period.  It can be seen that using the Joskow-Kahn methodology there is a large implied
output gap for the PG&E plants as well as for the plants of the new generators.
Having largely replicated the Joskow and Kahn analysis with day-ahead prices, the approach can
be applied with real-time price data. The real-time zonal uninstructed energy prices for NP-15
and SP-15
96 were then examined for these same 137 hours, and it was found that they exceeded
$120/MWh in only 86 hours in NP-15 and 85 hours in SP-15.  Table 15 portrays the result of
repeating the Joskow-Kahn output gap calculation for these high-priced real-time hours.  It is
seen that the average output of both the new generators and PG&E was generally higher in the
hours in which the average hourly real-time price was also high.  This would be expected in a
competitive industry as lower real-time prices should be expected to cause competitive firms to
                                               
96  See caiso.com\marketops\Oasis\pubmkt2.html. Ex Post Market Information (button 29).47
reduce output.  When the output gap is calculated for these high-priced real-time hours, the gap
falls by 204 MW in the north and 251 MW in the south, relative to that calculated by Joskow and
Kahn.
Table 15
Output Gap (MW), Not Adjusted for Outages
June 2000



















NP-15, SF and Z-26
Duke 2,563 2,422 141 2,416 147
Southern 2,932 2,090 842 2,300 632
Total 5,495 4,512 983 4,716 779
SF and Humboldt
PG&E 279 93 186 100 179
SP-15
AES 3,681 2,542 1,139 2,589 1,092
Duke 733 643 90 663 70
Dynegy 2,000 1,014 986 1,125 875
Reliant 3,487 2,351 1,136 2,424 1,063
Total 9,901 6,550 3,351 6,801 3,100
 Source:
(A) - (C): Joskow-Kahn, Table 8 and CEMS Replication Table 14, above
(D): CEMS
(E): Col. (A) – Col. (D)
It is possible to use these data to test whether the calculated output gap in the hours in which
both the PX and real-time prices exceeded $120/MWh is statistically different from the
calculated output gap in the hours in which the PX price exceeded $120/MWh in both NP-15 and
SP-15 but the real-time price did not.  For the purpose of this test we have dropped the hour
included in the Joskow-Kahn analysis in which the hypothetical unconstrained PX price
exceeded $120/MWh but the actual SP-15 PX price was less than $120/MWh. 
97 For the
combined North and South regions the mean output gap was 5,089 MW in the hours in which the
real-time price was less than $120/MWh and 3,862 MW in hours in which the real-time price
                                               
97  This is the reason that the mean for NP-15 used in the test differs slightly from the mean in Table 15.48
exceeded $120/MWh.  The difference is 1,217 MW which is statistically significantly different
from zero at above the 99.9 percent confidence level (the t-statistic is 5.70).
For the South alone the difference in means is 662 MW (3,762 to 3,100 MW), which is also
statistically significantly different from zero at more than the 99.9 percent confidence level (the
t-statistic is 4.37).  Finally, for the North alone the difference in means is 555 MW (1,326 to 771
MW), which is statistically significantly different from zero at above the 99.9 percent confidence
level (the t-statistic is 6.93).
Joskow and Kahn recognize that their initial comparison of output to estimated maximum unit
capacity (Table 8) makes no allowance for capacity not available due to outages.  To account for
the effect of unit outages on available capacity they develop three alternative measures of
available unit capacity:  capacity of units on-line in the hour; capacity of units on-line at some
time during the day; and capacity of units on-line at some time during that day or at some time
during the prior day.
98  While these measures adjust available capacity in the right direction, all
are imperfect measures of the amount of capacity not available due to outages, deratings or
environmental output restrictions and could materially overstate the available capacity in the
California market.  Tests 2 and 3 have the limitation that they include the capacity of units that
were not actually on-line during the hour and therefore could not generate energy.  While such a
lack of availability could reflect a unit being physically withheld from the market, it also could
reflect a unit that has suffered an outage since the start of the day or the prior day.
99  Moreover, it
is evident from the FERC staff discussion of forced and maintenance outages at Reliant and
NRG plants that these outages had an important effect on generation availability.
100
Test 1 excludes from the calculation of the output gap, the capacity of units that were not on-line
at the time.  This approach avoids including in the calculated output gap the capacity of units that
were unavailable due to forced outages.  In replicating their calculation of the output gap thus
adjusted for outages (Test 1), it became apparent that there were one or more typographical
errors in the figures Joskow and Kahn report for Southern Energy/Mirant.  Table 8 in Joskow-
Kahn reports a mean output of 2,090 for Southern and Table 10 reports a capacity of 2,395 MW,
which would imply an output gap of 305 MW rather than the 571 MW reported in Table 10.  Our
application of the Joskow-Kahn methodology to calculating capacity for Southern Energy
yielded a figure of 2,740 MW, however, rather than 2,395 MW for capacity, implying an output
gap by their standard of 650 MW.
101  The other capacity figures and output gaps in Joskow-Kahn
Table 10 were replicated, as shown in Table 16.
                                               
98  Joskow-Kahn, pp. 27-29.
99  As discussed below in item 6, the lack of availability could also reflect a unit whose start-up costs made it
uneconomic for the unit to start in order to meet a short term load and price spike.
100  FERC Outage Report, pp. 9, 17-19, 22-23, 27, 41-43, 48-50.
101  We have confirmed that the 571 MW figure is a typographical error and that 650 MW is the correct figure.49
Table 16
Output Gap (MW), Adjusted for Outages (Test 1)





















NP-15, SF and Z-26
Duke 2,541 2,422 119 2,541 2,422 119
Southern 2,395 2,090 571* 2,740 2,090 650
Total 4,936 4,512 690 5,281 4,512 769
SF and Humboldt
PG&E NA NA NA 109 93 16
SP-15
AES 2,945 2,542 403 2,945 2,542 403
Duke 723 643 80 723 643 80
Dynegy 1,611 1,014 597 1,611 1,014 597
Reliant 3,225 2,351 874 3,225 2,351 874
Total 8,504 6,550 1,954 8,504 6,550 1,954
*  Columns (A), (B) and (C) for Southern do not add due to typographical errors in original.
Sources:
(A), (C): Joskow-Kahn, Table 10
(B): Joskow-Kahn, Table 8
(D), (E): CEMS Replication
(F) (D) – Col. (E)
This calculation of an outage adjusted output gap was then repeated for the 86 hours in the north
and 85 hours in the South in which both the PX and real-time prices exceeded $120/MWh.  For
these hours, the Joskow-Kahn methodology yielded an estimated output gap by their standard of
598 MW in the north and 1,696 MW in the south.  This calculation of the real-time output gap is
reported in Table 17.  The overall output gap of 4,334 MW in Table 8 of Joskow-Kahn thus falls
to 2,294 MW if the capacity of off-line units is excluded (to account for outages) and the analysis
restricted to hours in which the real-time price exceeded $120/MWh.50
Table 17
Output Gap (MW), Adjusted for Outages (Test 1)
June 2000






















NP-15, SF and Z-26
Duke 2,541 2,422 119 2,528 2,416 112
Southern 2,740 2,090 650 2,786 2,300 486
Total 5,281 4,512 769 5,314 4,716 598
SF and Humboldt
PG&E 109 93 16 109 100 9
SP-15
AES 2,945 2,542 403 2,940 2,589 351
Duke 723 643 80 719 663 56
Dynegy 1,611 1,014 597 1,596 1,125 471
Reliant 3,225 2,351 874 3,242 2,424 818
Total 8,504 6,550 1,954 8,497 6,801 1,696
Sources:
(A) - (C): CEMS Replication Table 16, above, and Joskow-Kahn, Tables 8 and 10
(D) – (E):CEMS Replication
(F): (D) – (E)
It is again possible to use these data to test whether the calculated outage adjusted output gap in
the hours in which both the PX and real-time prices exceeded $120/MWh is statistically different
from the calculated outage adjusted output gap in the hours in which the PX price exceeded
$120/MWh in both NP-15 and SP-15 but the real-time price did not.  For the purpose of this test
we have again dropped the hour included in the Joskow-Kahn analysis in which the hypothetical
unconstrained PX price exceeded $120/MWh but the actual SP-15 PX price was less than
$120/MWh.
102 For the combined North and South regions the mean outage adjusted output gap
was 3,428 MW in the hours in which the real-time price was less than $120/MWh and 2,296
MW in hours in which the real-time price exceeded $120/MWh.  The difference is 1,132 MW
which is statistically significantly different from zero at above the 99.9 percent confidence level
(the t-statistic is 5.49).
                                               
102  This is the reason that the mean for NP-15 used in the test differs slightly from the mean in Table 17.51
For the South alone the difference in means is 676 MW (2,370 to 1,695 MW),
103 which is also
statistically significantly different from zero at more than the 99.9 percent confidence level (the
t-statistic is 4.41).  Finally, for the North alone the difference in means is 456 MW (1,056 to 601
MW), which is statistically significantly different from zero at above the 99.9 percent confidence
level (the t-statistic is 5.77).
3.  Outages, Output Restrictions and Deratings
Even the narrowest measure of available capacity employed by Joskow and Kahn (Test 1, which
is based on units on-line during the hour) has the potential to overstate available capacity.  There
are two main reasons for this.  First, an important implicit assumption of the Joskow-Kahn
withholding analysis is that the impact of forced outages is such that capacity of generating units
is either not available at all or available in its entirety.  In practice, however, a unit may suffer
equipment failures that reduce the unit’s capacity, without requiring that the unit be taken off-
line.
104  Indeed, it is particularly likely during high-priced hours that competitive unit owners
would endeavor to keep units with operating problems on-line but operating at reduced capacity.
Moreover, units that have suffered outages and attempt to come back on-line would be treated
under Test 1 as fully available during the hour in which they came on-line.  This would be true
even if the units failed to come back on-line and generated power only for a short period of time.
Second, as discussed above, some units are subject to environmental restrictions that may
preclude them from operating at full capacity.
The Joskow-Kahn methodology, however, makes no allowance for environmental restrictions
that reduced unit capacity at times during the summer.  As discussed in Section IV.B above,
these kinds of environmental limits may have affected the capacity of at least Duke’s South Bay
unit and Mirant’s Pittsburgh and Contra Costa units.
In most cases the capacity subject to these environmental restrictions would be available for use
in emergency conditions, but not all of the hours analyzed by Joskow and Kahn were emergency
conditions.  This is particularly true during July and August when rising gas and allowance costs
lifted the incremental costs of many units above the price thresholds used to identify high priced
hours in the Joskow-Kahn analysis.
105
It is not known how to assess the impact of deratings and other output limitations on the output
gap calculated by Joskow and Kahn using the CEMS data.  While a variety of procedures might
be used to try to draw inferences regarding such deratings from the CEMS data, it seems to us
that these procedures all have the potential to confuse withholding with deratings and vice versa.
The reality is that there is no point in devoting a lot of resources to making guesses about the
level of deratings and other output limitations in the hours analyzed by Joskow and Kahn, as the
                                               
103  The 1,695 MW differs slightly from the number in the table due to rounding.
104  A number of apparent examples of such partial outages or deratings are found in the recent FERC Report on
California outages, FERC Outage Report, pp. 8-9, 27-28, 43, 49.
105  To the extent that units face incremental costs above the thresholds, they should be removed from the analysis
of withholding.52
actual data regarding the level of capacity offered to the market by each unit is readily available
to the CAISO and thus presumably to FERC.
4.  Understated Ancillary Service Requirements.
Joskow and Kahn attempt to account for the CAISO’s ancillary service requirements in their
assessment of whether economic withholding occurred by accounting for the amount of capacity
in SP-15 and NP-15, separately, required for ancillary services.  Their approach is to compare
their estimate of the total output gap to the total ancillary service “requirements” or “demands”
for the zone and to infer the existence of possible withholding if the output gap exceeds the
ancillary service “requirement.”  As they note, such an approach would be conservative because
it would implicitly assume that all ancillary services were provided by California thermal units,
when in practice some portion of the ancillary services were likely provided by external units,
internal hydro or geothermal resources or quick-start units not included in the CEMS data.
106
Although Joskow and Kahn do not precisely identify the data they utilize to measure ancillary
service “demand,” their figures can be nearly exactly reproduced by averaging the CAISO
published data for hour-ahead ancillary service procurement from generators for NP-15
(excluding SF and Humboldt) and SP-15 (excluding Z-26),
107 as shown in Table 18.  It appears
from this replication that the Joskow-Kahn methodology is not quite as conservative as their
description suggests.  First, the data they apparently utilize is for ancillary services procured
from generation located within the zone, rather than total demand for ancillary services, and
therefore does not include ancillary services scheduled to be provided by load or imports.
Second, the figures cited by Joskow and Kahn for ancillary services demand in NP-15 and SP-15
do not include ancillary services procured in the SF or Z-26 zones, but their calculation of the
output gap includes thermal generation located in SF and Z-26.  Inclusion of the ancillary
services procured from generation located in SF and Z-26 increases the ancillary services
procurement calculated by Joskow and Kahn by somewhat more than 100 MW, as shown in
Table 18.
                                               
106  See Joskow-Kahn, p. 26.
107  See www.caiso.com/marketops/oasis/pubmkt2.html. Hour-ahead ancillary procurement (button 20).53
Table 18
Mean Hour-Ahead Ancillary Service Procurement (MW) from
Generation by Zone and Region
June 2000, PX Price > $120/MWh
NP-15 North













Regulation -- 407 413 -- 519 0
Spin -- 471 496 -- 142 13
Non-Spin -- 181 198 -- 387 1
Total, excluding
replacement
-- 1,058 1,107 1,044 1,048 15
Replacement -- 448 502 628 629 2
Total 1,510 1,506 1,610 1,672 1,678 16
Unadjusted
Output Gap
983 983 983 3,351 3,351 16
1  North includes NP-15, SF and Z-26.
Sources:
(A), (D): Joskow-Kahn, Tables 8 and 13
(B), (C),  (E) and (F):  www.caiso.com\marketops\OASIS\pubmkt2.html
As discussed above, it is also desirable to revise this calculation to exclude the hours in which
day-ahead prices were high, but real-time prices were not high and thus generation was
dispatched down in real-time.  This information is portrayed in Table 19.  Perhaps because these
hours were somewhat higher load than the hours in which real-time prices were lower, the
procurement of ancillary services other than replacement reserves from generators averaged
slightly higher in these hours than in the hours analyzed by Joskow and Kahn (2,224 MW versus
2,155 MW).  More materially, the CAISO acquired far more replacement reserves on average
during these hours than in the 137 hours analyzed by Joskow and Kahn, so that the total ancillary
services procurement for generation corresponding to the generation assets included in
calculating the output gap was 3,690 MW in the high real-time price hours compared to 3,288
MW in the high priced PX hours (1,610 + 1,678) and the 3,182 MW figure originally calculated
by Joskow and Kahn (1,510 + 1,672).
108
                                               
108  Joskow-Kahn, Table 8, p. 26.54
Table 19
Ancillary Service Procurement (MW) from Generation
by Zone and Region






Regulation 433 535 968
Spin 491 153 645
Non-Spin 201 411 612
Total, excluding replacement 1,125 1,100 2,224
Replacement 621 845 1,466
Total 1,746 1,945 3,690
Output Gap
    No Outage Adjustment 779 3,100 3,879
    Adjusted for Outages 598 1,696 2,294
1  North includes NP-15, SF and Z-26.
Source:  www.caiso.com\marketops\OASIS\pubmkt2.html
As Joskow and Kahn note, since replacement reserves were acquired by the CAISO in part to
meet load, rather than to provide 10-minute reserves or regulation, replacement reserve
procurement does not necessarily give rise to a real-time “output gap.”
109  If all of the capacity
providing replacement reserves were used to meet real-time load, there would be no output gap
in the CEMS data attributable to the replacement reserve capacity.  There are, however, several
complications in comparing the calculated output gap to ancillary service procurement from
generation, excluding replacement reserves.
First, it needs to be recognized that the CAISO procured a substantial proportion of its 10-minute
non-spinning reserves from load (133 MW in the north, 287 MW in the south, 420 MW total), or
from imports in these high real-time priced hours (see Table 20).
110  We have not been able to
identify publicly available information that indicates whether operationally the CAISO
interrupted the loads providing non-spinning reserves before dispatching replacement reserves
(and thus used the replacement reserves to replace the loads as 10-minute reserves) or after
dispatching replacement reserves (and thus dispatched the replacement reserves to meet load and
kept the load reserves in the form of reserves).  Similarly, it is not known whether the CAISO
dispatched imports providing 10-minute reserves before dispatching replacement reserves (and
thus used the replacement reserves to replace the imports as 10-minute reserves) or after
                                               
109 Joskow-Kahn,  p.  26.
110  Imports of spin and non-spin average 394 MW in the 86 hours in which both PX and real-time prices exceeded
$120/MWh.55
dispatching replacement reserves (and thus dispatched the replacement reserves to meet load and
kept the import capacity in the form of reserves).
Furthermore, it is not known whether the CAISO sought to maintain the location of its non-
replacement reserves in real time or allowed the location of these reserves to shift as it met load,
so that the average real-time geographic distribution of reserves might differ from the geographic
distribution in the hour-ahead schedules.
111  It can be seen in Table 20 that the total procurement
of ancillary services, excluding replacement reserves, is considerably in excess of  the
procurement from generation.  Without knowing how the CAISO used these ancillary service
resources in real time it is not possible to determine how much of the capacity included in the
calculated real-time output gap for the various subregions was in fact providing ancillary
services in real time.
                                               
111  Joskow-Kahn consider the impact of transmission congestion on their estimated output gap; however, they only
consider the impact of congestion on inter-zonal dispatch of energy.  They observe that there was no South to
North congestion during most of the hours in which they identify an output gap and apparently draw the
conclusion that the dispatch of energy to meet load was not impacted by these constraints (pp. 30-31).  These
data, however, are also consistent with the possibility that the CAISO met NP-15 load with NP-15 generation,
including generation procured as reserves, and carried more of its real-time reserves in SP-15.  Thus, part of the
reason that the real-time output gap in the north is so much less than ancillary service procurement may be that
in real-time during some of these high-priced hours the CAISO disproportionately used its reserves in the north
to meet load, resulting in more of its real-time reserves being carried in the south.56
Table 20
Ancillary Service Procurement and Requirements (MW)

















Regulation 433 535 0 968 0 634
Spin 491 153 279 923 9 1,080
Total Non-Spin 334 698 115 1,147 2 1,115
  Gen Non-Spin 201 411 115 728 2
  Load Non-Spin 133 287 0 420 0
Total, excluding
replacement
1,258 1,387 394 3,038 10 2,829
Output Gap
Not Outage Adjusted 779 3,100 3,879
Outage Adjusted 598 1,696 2,294
Source: Output Gap, Tables 15 and 17.
Ancillary service data: www.caiso.com\marketops\OASIS\pubmkt2.html
North includes NP-15, SF and Z-26.
Overall, the CAISO was maintaining 3,000 MW of regulation room and 10-minute reserves
somewhere on the system during the 86 high-priced hours but the data utilized by Joskow and
Kahn are not sufficient to resolve the location at which these reserves were carried in real time,
particularly in hours in which large amounts of replacement reserves were also available for
dispatch.  Moreover, since the CAISO apparently does not publish real-time load by zone, it has
not been possible to compare the average level of replacement reserves by zone with the amount
of load met with reserves in real time in each zone.
112
Second, the amount of capacity procured as replacement reserves does not necessarily
correspond to the amount of capacity needed to meet real-time load.  The reported figure for
procurement of replacement reserves will understate the amount of reserves potentially used to
meet real-time load to the extent that the CAISO purchased capacity to meet its replacement
reserve target as regulation, spinning reserves or 10-minute reserves under the rational buyer
                                               
112  Even if such zonal load data were available, it would probably be necessary to analyze the data hour by hour to
draw any inferences as to whether real-time load could have been met solely with replacement reserves located
in that zone.57
protocol.  This consideration would cause replacement reserve procurement to understate the
amount of reserves actually used to meet load in real time and thus overstate the amount of any
output gap that is attributable to ancillary service requirements.  An alternative approach to
measuring ancillary service requirements that would address this potential overstatement would
be to compare the calculated output gap to the total ancillary service requirement (excluding
replacement reserves), rather than procurement, as shown in Column F of Table 20.  A
comparison of Columns (F) and (D) suggest that the figure for ancillary services excluding
replacement reserves calculated from hour-ahead ancillary service procurement likely includes,
on average, around 200 MW of replacement reserves bought as regulation, spin or non-spin.
In addition, the quantity of reserves procured by the California ISO during June was not always
sufficient to meet load and maintain the minimum level of operating reserves.
113  The amount of
capacity actually providing reserves in real time would therefore have been less than the
requirement identified in Table 20 during these shortage hours, so a comparison of ancillary
requirements to the output gap could still overstate the amount of capacity providing ancillary
services in real time.
The final reason that the amount of capacity procured as replacement reserves may not
correspond to the amount of capacity needed to meet real-time load is that neither data on
ancillary service procurements nor requirements informs us as to whether the California ISO’s
replacement reserve requirement, or target, was on average above or below the amount of
additional capacity that would be required to meet load and reserve targets.  To the extent that
the CAISO systematically over or underestimated load,  sought to provide a capacity cushion in
excess of expected load,
114 or sought to be very conservative in scheduling replacement reserves,
the replacement reserve target would differ from the amount of reserve capacity that was on
average used to meet real-time load.
The third complication in comparing the calculated output gap to ancillary service requirements
and procurement is that it needs to be kept in mind that an unknown amount of reserves and
regulation would have been provided during these hours by units not included in the Joskow-
Kahn analysis, including hydro units, geothermal units, and small units not included in the
CEMS database.  To the extent that these other sources were actually used to meet ancillary
services requirements, more of the calculated output gap could reflect withholding or other
factors.
Given these considerations, the  output gap methodology has a relatively large margin of error in
assessing the amount of capacity actually used in real time to provide ancillary services on the
units analyzed.  While the CAISO dispatch data should reveal which undispatched capacity was
providing reserves in real time, there is a rather large margin of error in the Joskow-Kahn
approach, ranging from thousands of megawatts of ancillary services that might have been
                                               
113  Data on reserve shortages do not appear to be publicly available.  It is possible to infer from a variety of data
that is publicly available that California was short of reserves during many hours in June 2000 (see Harvey-
Hogan, pp. 22-25).
114 In general, the CAISO operating procedures provide that the CAISO will procure 300-700 MW of replacement
reserves (in excess of those required to meet load) (see ISO Operating Procedure M-402, July 14, 2000).58
provided by off-line thermal units, or other units not included in their analysis (including hydro
and geothermal units) to thousands of megawatts of additional ancillary services that might have
been provided by the thermal units they analyze, replacing imports or load in providing spinning
and non-spinning reserves.  It is evident from Tables 17 and 20 that the output gap, adjusted for
unit outages, is substantially less than the total reserves including replacement reserves procured
from internal generation and substantially less than total ancillary service requirements excluding
replacement reserves.  The entire output gap could therefore be accounted for by ancillary
service requirements (deratings, overstated capacity and the other factors discussed below).
Conversely, these data also do not allow one to rule out the possibility that much of the real-time
ancillary service requirements were being carried on units not included in the CEMS data and the
output gap, in part, reflects economic withholding.  Hence, the data could be consistent with
either a fully competitive market with no withholding or with a market in which withholding
raised prices.  Without access to the dispatch data, the margin of error looks to be larger than the
effect to be measured.
5.  Uneconomic Energy
The Joskow-Kahn analysis does not differentiate between capacity that is economically or
physically withheld in order to exercise market power and that which is economically withheld
because the market price is less than the unit’s incremental costs.  Joskow and Kahn argue that
all of the units analyzed in the CEMS data had incremental costs in June that were less than
$120/MWh, but acknowledge that this was not the case for the units included in their analysis for
subsequent months, particularly August and September.
115  Although Joskow and Kahn assert
that this limitation does not apply to their results for July,
116 given the low threshold used to
define a high priced day in July ($90), it appears likely that many units would have had
incremental gas and allowance costs above the threshold.  Indeed, one of the peculiarities of the
withholding analysis is that lower price thresholds are used in the analysis for the months of July
and September, even though gas and NOx allowance costs are both known to be higher than in
June.
Even the $120 figure for June needs to be interpreted cautiously.  First, it is not clear that the
time path of RTC prices can be traced with as much precision as Joskow and Kahn suggest.
Most of the transactions are recorded during the two-month settlement period following the end
of the cycle.  Not only are there relatively few transactions recorded during June, but the link
between the record date and the price negotiation date is murky.  While it may be reasonable to
conclude that arm’s-length RTC prices during June were in the range of $5 to $20 per pound, it
is not clear that it can be concluded that the RTC price used in formulating bids during the latter
part of June was no higher than $10.  Second, Joskow and Kahn base their evaluation of fuel
costs on a posited marginal heat rate of 12,000 Btu/kWh.  It is possible that this conjecture is
correct for marginal heat rates, but the CEMS data indicates that it is far from accurate for
average heat rates for many of these units.  The marginal heat rate is relevant to assessing
whether it would be economic to fully dispatch a unit given that it is on-line, but the economics
                                               
115  Joskow-Kahn, pp. 25, 32-33.
116 Joskow-Kahn,  p.  33.59
of committing a unit to operate depend on the unit’s average or full load heat rate (and the start-
up or minimum-load costs incurred in order to have the unit on-line discussed below).  It appears
that several units included in the Joskow-Kahn withholding analysis, including Redondo 5 and 6,
Alamitos 1 and 2,  and Alta 3.1 and 3.2 may have had generating costs, including emission
allowances but excluding variable O&M, in the range of $120 to $150/MWh.  Some of these
units may therefore  have been off-line during some of the hours analyzed by Joskow and Kahn
simply because they were not economic to operate at the expected day-ahead prices for those
hours.
Another factor that is not taken into account in the Joskow-Kahn withholding analysis is the
increasing impact of environmental restrictions as the summer progressed.  The reality is that a
number of the units included in the Joskow-Kahn withholding analysis reached environmental
operating limits before the end of the year.  These units were not engaged in anticompetitive
withholding; on the contrary, we know with the benefit of hindsight that they failed to engage in
enough economic withholding to stay within their operating limits.  These plants should have
been bid in at higher prices than was actually the case during the first part of 2000.  No
allowance is directly made in the Joskow-Kahn analysis for the underpricing of this capacity.
This kind of economically efficient output allocation would be treated the same as market power
withholding under the Joskow-Kahn Test 1 approach to analyzing withholding in June 2000, as
the units would be counted as withholding if they were on-line but not operating at capacity and
the Joskow-Kahn analysis includes no other allowance for the impact of annual capacity factor
restrictions.
117  The owners of the units that ultimately reached environmental operating limits
would have at some point during the summer begun factoring these environmental restrictions
into their scheduling decisions, operating the units only during the highest-priced hours, with
large margins.
118  Since the Joskow-Kahn analysis of July-September includes many relatively
low-priced hours with low margins, units subject to annual operating restrictions would be
expected in a competitive market to be off-line or operating at reduced capacity factors in these
hours to conserve their hours of operation for hours of extreme capacity shortage.
6.  Start-up and Minimum-Load Costs
Unlike electricity markets in PJM and New York, the California day-ahead markets for energy
(PX) and ancillary services (ISO) were based on one-part bids evaluated on an hour-by-hour
basis.  A day-head PX price of $120 might cover the variable cost of incremental output, yet it
might be uneconomic for the unit owner to start that unit or keep it on-line overnight in order to
                                               
117  The data source used for analysis of the July-September period includes more units subject to very strict run
time limits.  Indeed, some of these units had fewer hours of allowed operation per year than the number of high-
priced June hours analyzed by Joskow and Kahn.
118  It is unclear from publicly available data when market participants began to recognize the potential to exhaust
their NOx allowances.  While AES did not mention the potential to exhaust its NOx allowances in its second
quarter report, its third quarter report disclosed this possibility.  The AES Corporation, Form 10Q for the period
ending September 30, 2000, p. 13.  Understanding of AES unit constraints is also complicated by the terms of
the forward sale of the capacity to Williams.60
sell energy at a price of $120, particularly if the price exceeded $120 for a relatively small
number of hours.
Since all of the units included in the CEMS data are steam units with start-up and minimum-load
costs, it is incorrect to infer that a competitive firm would always be willing to offer supply from
these units at a day-ahead price of $120/MWh, even if $120/MWh accurately reflected the
incremental running cost of the unit.  As discussed previously in Harvey-Hogan,
119 the day-
ahead one-part offer price of a unit lacking market power but having start-up and no-load costs
depends in a complex way on expected prices during that hour and other hours of the day.  One
approach to accounting for start-up and no-load costs would be to use daily strip prices to
determine whether a unit would have been economic to operate for the day as a whole,
120 and
then analyze real-time output hour by hour for the hours with high real-time prices.
An alternative approach to controlling for start-up and no-load costs would be to restrict the
analysis to the output decisions of units that were actually on-line in real-time.  Start-up and no-
load costs are irrelevant for units that are actually operating, as those costs are sunk in real time.
This approach to accounting for start-up and no-load costs corresponds to the Joskow-Kahn Test
1 for measuring available capacity, as this test would only include the capacity of units on-line
during the hour.  Part of the large difference between the unadjusted output gap Joskow and
Kahn calculate and the output gap calculated using Test 1 is, therefore, potentially due to the
impact of start-up and no-load costs and high average operating costs, as well as outages.  This
needs to be kept in mind in evaluating the calculated output gap for the months of July, August
and September as Joskow and Kahn do not apply Test 1 to measuring available capacity in these
periods, yet the higher operating costs during these periods (due to higher gas and NOx
allowance costs) could raise the price at which starting such a unit or keeping it on overnight
would be economic for a competitive firm.
7.  CAISO Dispatch Instructions
There are several respects in which capacity included in the output gap as calculated by Joskow
and Kahn might reflect units dispatched down in real time by the CAISO (aside from the
ancillary service requirements discussed above) despite bids less than $120/MWh.  First, units
submitting $120/MWh or lower adjustment bids would have average output that is less than their
capacity in hours in which the average hourly real-time price exceeded $120/MWh if prices
varied during the hour and the units operated at different levels during the hour.  Second, units
submitting $120/MWh or lower adjustment bids could be dispatched down by the California ISO
in hours in which real-time prices exceeded $120/MWh as a result of intra-zonal congestion.
Third, units that submitted real-time adjustment bids of less than $120/MWh but experienced
difficulty ramping or maintaining maximum output or were not dispatched by the ISO due to a
slow response time could have average hourly output that is less than their maximum output
during hours in which real-time prices exceeded their adjustment bid. Fourth, it is a design
                                               
119  See Harvey-Hogan, pp. 14-16.
120  This evaluation would compare the cost of keeping the unit on overnight or its start-up costs (whichever is
lower) to its expected on-peak margin.61
feature of the California market that units submitting $120/MWh or lower adjustment bids would
not necessarily be dispatched up by the California ISO in an hour in which the real-time price
exceeded $120/MWh.  There is some information available on real-time price variation;
however, there do not appear to be any publicly available data that would enable one to assess
directly the practical impact of the second, third and fourth effects during the summer of 2000.
Consider first the impact of price and output averaging.  The Joskow-Kahn methodology
implicitly analyzes the relationship between unit capacity and average unit utilization in the hour.
The average output of the unit, however, is limited by the peak output, and thermal steam units
such as those analyzed by Joskow and Kahn would likely have been providing load following
capability to the CAISO.  Thus, a unit might have been fully dispatched at the intra-hour load
peak at which the price exceeded $120, but would be less than fully dispatched on average over
the hour if prices fell below $120/MWh during other dispatch intervals.  It is apparently not
possible to develop estimates of the potential magnitude of the effect by comparing average
hourly load to the intra-hour peak load, because the CAISO does not publish data on intra-hour
load levels.  The magnitude of the change in average loads from hour to hour often exceeds
1,000 MW on peak days, however, suggesting that differences between peak and average hourly
load could exceed 500 MW.  Moreover, of the 85 or 86 hours in which both the PX and hourly
real-time prices exceeded $120, 25 were adjacent to an hour in which the hourly real-time price
was less than $120, 15 were adjacent to hours in which the hourly real-time price was less than
$80 and 4 were adjacent to hours in which the hourly real-time price was less than $20/MWh,
suggesting that steam units likely would have been ramping up or down during a number of these
hours.
A non-systematic examination of the CAISO ex-post 10-minute prices on high-priced days in
June 2000 (www.caiso.com\cgitbin\pubmrt2.cgi) reveals instances in which hourly real-time
prices (the zonal uninstructed energy price) exceeded $120/MWh and the BEEP prices ranged
from zero to $400 or more within the hour or within six to eight intervals across hours.  It is not
surprising that there would be an “output” gap in circumstances in which the dispatch price first
falls to zero for 20 to 40 minutes and then suddenly rises.
The significance of this effect has been tested by recalculating the output gap for the hours in
which the real-time hourly price was both high and units with bids below $120/MWh likely
would not have been ramping up or down (i.e., hours in which the real-time price exceeded
$120/MWh in the preceding and following hour as well).  The results of this calculation are
shown in Table 21, and it is seen that although the available capacity of on-line units is 185 MW
higher in these hours, output is 590 MW higher so the apparent output gap is reduced by 405
MW (to 1,889 MW), suggesting that a substantial portion of the apparent output gap may be due
to units ramping up or down during hours when prices are rising or falling, rather than due to
economic withholding.62
Table 21
Output Gap (MW), Adjusted for Outages and Ramping




















NP-15, SF and Z-26
Duke 2,528 2,416 112 2,535 2,437 98
Southern 2,786 2,300 486 2,816 2,520 296
Total North 5,314 4,716 598 5,351 4,957 394
SF and Humboldt
PG&E 109 100 9 109 105 4
SP-15
AES 2,940 2,589 351 2,975 2,643 332
Duke 719 663 56 729 694 35
Dynegy 1,596 1,125 471 1,622 1,235 387
Reliant 3,242 2,424 818 3,319 2,578 741
Total SP-15 8,497 6,801 1,696 8,645 7,150 1,495
Source:
 (A) – (C) Table 17
 (D) – (E) CEMS Data
 (F) = (D) – (E)
It is also possible to use these data to test whether the calculated outage adjusted output gap in
the hours in which both the PX and real-time prices exceeded $120/MWh is statistically different
from the calculated outage adjusted output gap in the hours in which both the PX and real-time
prices exceeded $120/MWh and the real-time price was high both before and after the hour in
question.  Once again, for the purpose of this test we have dropped the hour included in the
Joskow-Kahn analysis in which the hypothetical unconstrained PX price exceeded $120/MWh
but the actual SP-15 PX price was less than $120/MWh.
121 For the combined North and South
regions the mean outage adjusted output gap in the hours in which both the PX and real-time
price exceeded $120/MWh but the real-time price was lower in either the preceding or following
hour was 3,017 MW but only 1,881 MW in the hours in which the real-time price exceeded
$120/MWh both before and after the hour as well. The difference is 1,136 MW which is
statistically significantly different from zero at above the 99.9 percent confidence level (the t-
statistic is 5.40).
                                               
121  This is the reason that the mean for NP-15 used in the test differs slightly from the mean in Table 21.63
For the South alone the difference in means is 552 MW (2,045 to 1,493 MW), which is also
statistically significantly different from zero at more than the 99 percent confidence level (the t-
statistic is 3.35).  Finally, for the North alone the difference in means is 584 MW (972 to 388
MW), which is statistically significantly different from zero at above the 99.9 percent confidence
level (the t-statistic is 7.54).
Table 22 compares the recalculated output gap in the high-priced non-ramping hours to ancillary
service procurement from generation in those same hours.  It is seen that the output gap is a few
hundred MW less than ancillary service procurement from generation excluding replacement
reserves and far less than ancillary service procurement including replacement reserves.
122  As
noted above, generation scheduled to provide replacement reserves might have been dispatched
to meet load in real time or might have provided reserves while other capacity was dispatched to
meet load.  Again, it is seen that the potential variation in the size of the factors included in the
output gap is too large, relative to the size of the calculated output gap, to permit findings that
output either has or has not been economically withheld from the market.
Table 22
Output Gap and Ancillary Service Procurement (MW) from
Generation by Zone and Region
June 2000, PX and Real-Time Price > $120/MWh
Non-Ramping Hours
North SP-15 Total
Regulation 347 612 959
Spinning Reserves 494 169 664
Non-Spinning Reserves 196 396 593
Total Excluding Replacement 1,038 1,178 2,216
Replacement Reserves 758 1,095 1,854
Total A/S 1,796 2,273 4,069
Outage Adjusted Output Gap 394 1,495 1,889
North includes NP-15, SF and Z-26.
Source:   Output Gap Table 21.
Ancillary Service Procurement: www.caiso.com\marketops\OASIS\pubmkt2.html
                                               
122  Ramping constraints likely also contributed to an apparent output gap even within the stable high-priced real-
time hours.  Some of the capacity that is on-line in these hours had only recently come on-line and was likely
ramp-constrained in providing energy and reserves.  Thus, an average of 150 MW/hour of capacity in these
high-priced hours had started up within the prior four hours and roughly 80 MW of the output gap in Table 22
was on these units.64
Second, intra-zonal congestion management can require that generators at particular locations be
dispatched down by the CAISO despite zonal prices that exceed the unit’s bid.  In these
circumstances, there is a generation pocket in which some resources cannot be utilized to provide
either energy or ancillary services.  It is therefore possible for generator offers below $120 to not
be accepted for dispatch at times that the zonal price exceeds $120.
123  Because of California’s
zonal pricing system, the published price data do not indicate whether there were any such
generation pockets during the high-priced days in June.
The potential for such output-reducing generation pockets can be seen, however, in the publicly
available nodal prices of other ISOs.  For example, June 26, 2000 was the highest price day in
the New York day-ahead market with prices east of Central East exceeding $1,000/MWh, yet
there were also a number of generation pockets east of Central East with locational prices below
$100/MWh because of transmission constraints that prevented the generation at these locations
from being fully scheduled to meet load or to provide reserves.
Third, during high-priced hours in which every unit not providing reserves would ideally be
dispatched to its maximum capacity, any inability of units to either ramp quickly up to maximum
in the initial high priced hour or to sustain maximum output over a long period of time would
translate into an output gap for that unit.  Alternatively, a slow responding unit might be skipped
by the CAISO and the interval price set by a high-cost unit with a faster response time.  There
would be an offsetting increase in output by other units including those providing regulation but
the source of the replacement output could be units not included in the CEMS data.  Fourth, it is
a design feature of the California market that the California ISO’s real-time dispatch does not
clear the market.  In particular, the ISO’s software has been specifically designed so that it will
be the case that if the zonal price is $120 and there is no intra-zonal congestion, it is possible for
there to be adjustment Dec bids above $120 that have not been accepted or Inc bids below $120
that have not been accepted.  The potential for unaccepted Inc bids below $120 would likely be
greatest if prices were falling.  Of the 85 and 86 hours with day ahead and average real-time
prices exceeding $120, 29 were followed by hours in which the average real-time price was at
least $20/MWh lower.
8.  Unit Capacity
The Joskow-Kahn study estimates unit capacity based on the maximum output in the quarter.
This methodology also introduces imprecision into the calculation of the output gap as it has the
potential to either overstate or understate actual capacity.  First, it may overstate capacity
because it does not account for the impact of ambient temperature on unit capacity.  Many of
these capacity estimates are based on unit outputs during April and May.  Because the capacity
of electric generating units can depend on ambient temperature, the Joskow-Kahn methodology
                                               
123  Joskow and Kahn assert that “intrazonal constraints would not affect production levels within a zone” (p. 30),
but this is incorrect.  This might be true under the simplified assumptions of the zonal model, but it is not true in
the real dispatch.  So-called “intra-zonal” congestion can be managed by interruptible load and extra-zonal
generation as well, and both effects would lead to lower total zonal production.  This would be more likely to be
true during high-priced hours when all thermal generation units are supposedly already at their maximum level
of output.65
for estimating capacity has the potential to overstate capacity if the maximum output occurred on
a day with lower ambient temperatures.  The effect of temperature on capacity, however, would
typically not be large for the steam units included in the CEMS data for June.
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Second, the Joskow-Kahn methodology for determining capacity could also potentially
understate capacity, if part of the capacity of the unit were consistently used to provide reserves,
not energy.  Thus, if a generation owner consistently bid the top range of one of its units into the
market for reserves and submitted a very high energy adjustment bid in real time, it is possible
that this capacity could go through the quarter without ever being dispatched.
Third, the Joskow-Kahn methodology for determining capacity, particularly the reliance on the
highest output achieved by the unit, even if achieved only in a single hour, has the potential for
basing the capacity estimate on anomalous data, atypical operating conditions or output levels
that can be sustained only for short periods of time.
Fourth, Joskow and Kahn apparently applied their maximum output methodology on a unit-by-
unit basis rather than a station or plant basis.  In cases in which some or all of the units
composing a station share some facilities, some or all of the individual units may be able to
achieve higher than nameplate outputs if the other units in the plant are off-line and the plant is
operated to maximize the output of the individual unit.  The aggregate of these individual unit
outputs could then, however, exceed the capacity of the plant, and capacity estimates based on
the sum of the maximum hourly output of the individual units, could overstate plant capacity.
An effort was made to assess the potential direction and magnitude of errors in measuring
capacity by comparing the unit capacities estimated based on the Joskow-Kahn methodology
with other data on unit capacity.  Data on the nameplate capacity of the Mirant units are available
on the Mirant website as well as in the Klein and EIA reports, permitting a comparison with the
Joskow-Kahn figures as shown in Table 23.  For these units the Joskow-Kahn estimate of the
capacity of Contra Costa 6 and 7 is 691 MW, which exceeds the capacity figures of 676-680
MW in the other sources.  On the other hand, it can be seen that these units operated at the rates
used by Joskow and Kahn for a non-trivial number of hours.  Joskow and Kahn estimate the
capacity of Pittsburgh 1-4 at 645 MW compared to a nameplate capacity of 652 MW in the other
sources.  These output rates, however, appear to have very rarely been achieved.  Joskow and
Kahn then estimate the capacity of Pittsburgh 5 and 6 at 663 MW compared to a nameplate
capacity in other sources of 650 MW.  These units appear to have rarely achieved the capacities
used by Joskow and Kahn but did operate above their nameplate capacity for a non-trivial
number of hours.  The Joskow-Kahn capacity estimate for Pittsburgh 7 is in line with other
sources but the unit rarely operated at this level.  Finally, Joskow and Kahn estimate the capacity
of Potrero 3 at 213 MW compared to a nameplate capacity on the Mirant website and in Klein of
207 MW.  It is evident that there is a range in capacity estimates and that the highest output a
unit has achieved under perhaps ideal conditions is not necessarily a good indicator of the output
it can generate on a consistent basis.  The effects are likely not large but reflect an additional
increment of output gap in Table 22 that is not appropriately attributed to economic withholding.
                                               
124   The effect can be large for combined-cycle and combustion turbines but the EPA/CEMS data do not include
combustion turbines.66
Table 23


































Contra Costa 6 346 227 346 14 339 340 340 346
Contra Costa 7 345 40 345 5 337 340 340 344
Pittsburgh 1 163 1 161 1 163 163 163 160
Pittsburgh 2 163 6 160 8 163 163 163 159
Pittsburgh 3 163 1 163 1 163 163 163 160
Pittsburgh 4 161 8 161 3 163 163 163 157
Pittsburgh 5 332 4 332 2 325 325 325 329
Pittsburgh 6 331 2 331 2 325 325 325 329
Pittsburgh 7 721 1 720 1 682 720 720 716
Potrero 3 213 2 213 2 260 207 207 211
Total 2938 2932 2920 2909 2909 2911
Sources:
(A) CEMS data, maximum gross unit output Jan 1 – June 20, 2000.
(B) CEMS data, maximum number of hours rate in Column (A) was achieved in first half 2000.
(C) CEMS data, maximum gross unit output April 1 – June 30, 2000.  Joskow-Kahn.
(D) CEMS data, number of hours rate in Column (C) was achieved in second quarter 2000.
(E) EIA, “Inventory of Nonutility Electric Power Plants in the United States 1999,” November 2000.
www.eia.doc.gov/cneaf/electricity/ipp/ipp2.pdf.
(F) Joel Klein, “The Use of Heat Rates in Production Cost Modeling and Market Modeling,” April 17, 1998.
(G) www.Southernenergy.com
(H) CEMS data, maximum gross output achieved in 1% or more of hours on-line Jan 1 – June 30, 2000.
9.  Market Inefficiency
The day-ahead and real-time markets coordinated by the CAISO and CA PX operate in
important respects as pay-as-bid markets.
125  The need for generators to bid the market-clearing
price in order to avoid price discrimination applied through the rational buyer rule and ensure
that they are paid the market-clearing price creates a degree of market inefficiency that may
appear much the same as anticompetitively motivated withholding.
126  Most of these bidding
incentives would not affect clearing prices in a world with perfect foresight.  Moreover, these
incentives are likely to be more important in the day-ahead markets than in real time.  In the real
world with imperfect foresight and considerable price volatility, however, the pay-as-bid market
                                               
125  These features are discussed in detail in Harvey-Hogan, pp. 4-14.
126  A critical difference is that the market inefficiency affects the incentives and behavior of all firms participating
in the market, not merely the largest net supplier, and can be eliminated only by changing the market design.67
features have the potential to create inefficiency and raise prices.  For instance, in a simulation of
the U.K. market, Bower and Bunn found that switching from a market-clearing to a pay-as-bid
auction format increased prices from 100 to 200 percent higher during peak periods.
127  This
outcome is particularly likely in potential shortage conditions in which the price cap is binding.
Moreover, it has long been recognized that the real-time dispatch by the CAISO contains
artificial restrictions that are intended to prevent the CAISO from undertaking least-cost dispatch
and rationalizing the supply and demand for energy in real-time.
128  The inevitable and intended
consequence of these restrictions on least-cost dispatch is to ensure that low-cost generation
capacity at times goes utilized in favor of other higher-cost resources.  The impact of these
restrictions is thereby to restrict output and raise market prices, but this is the intended outcome
of the market design, not the result of anticompetitive behavior by market participants.
10.   Summary
The output gap calculated by Joskow and Kahn includes the effects of many considerations,
including ancillary service requirements, real-time price variations, unit outages, unit deratings,
environmental limitations, CAISO dispatch instructions, ramping constraints, effects of
minimum load costs, any inability of units to consistently achieve their design capacity and the
inefficiency of the California market.  All of these effects would show up as economic or
physical withholding unless they are accounted for in the analysis.  It is seen above that if the
output gap is calculated to account for real-time prices, units that are off-line and ramping
constraints, the output gap is less than ancillary service procurement from generation other than
replacement reserves and far less than ancillary service procurement from generation including
replacement reserves or the overall ancillary service requirement, excluding replacement
reserves (see Tables 22 and 20).  This measure of the output gap still includes the impact of
several factors unrelated to economic or physical withholding such as unit deratings,
environmental limitations, CAISO dispatch instructions, any inability of units to achieve their
design capacity and the inefficiency of the California market.  Therefore, the CEMS data do not
provide evidence that can distinguish between strategic withholding and other market factors.
At the same time, the calculation of the output gap and ancillary service requirements does not
account for the capacity of off-line thermal units such as GTs, reserves provided by hydro or
geothermal units or the possibility that the CAISO did not meet its reserve target in all hours.  It
therefore also cannot be concluded from the demonstration that the output gap is much smaller
than reserve requirements, or that all of the capacity included in the output gap was either
providing ancillary services, dispatched down by the CAISO, or unable to operate due to unit
deratings, environmental limitations or overstated capacities.  In other words, the range of error
in this approach appears to be larger than the amount of the economic withholding that might
have occurred.  The result could go either way.
                                               
127  John Bower and Derek W. Bunn, “Model-Based Comparisons of Pool and Bilateral Markets for Electricity,”
Energy Journal, Vol. 21, November 3, 2000, pp. 1-29.  The higher prices arose from both inefficiencies and
from the greater exercise of market power.  This huge price increase in the U.K. simulations would be unlikely
to result in the California market from inefficiency alone, but it illustrates the problems created by market
design.
128  See footnote 6 above.68
V.   MARKET DESIGN, PRICES AND INCENTIVES
Joskow and Kahn address a difficult public policy question with publicly available data using
two distinct approaches.  Both of their approaches face the reality, however, that the range of
uncertainty in the publicly available data measuring available capacity, capacity used to provide
ancillary services, capacity used to generate energy at the intra-hour peak and capacity
dispatched down by the CAISO could exceed the magnitude of any strategic anticompetitive
withholding that might have occurred.  The CAISO dispatch data would reveal the total available
capacity of the on-line units (net of derations, i.e., the upper limit of the units bid in for
supplemental energy), and the amount of this capacity that was either used to generate energy,
provide ancillary services, or was backed down by the CAISO to manage congestion or balance
generation and load.  The CAISO dispatch data, moreover, would reveal whether capacity was
being economically withheld (i.e., not used to provide energy or ancillary services) in real time
during the shortage hours, based on the actual generator schedules and capacity available in each
hour.  A fundamental limitation of studies based on the CEMS data is that they must be based on
very imperfect measures of things the CAISO dispatch data would reveal exactly.
The CAISO dispatch data, however, would not provide the information required to determine
whether prices have been affected by physical, rather than economic, withholding.  This would
require the assessment of  the causation of each forced outage or unit derating, assessing the
impact of start-up and minimum-load costs on decisions to operate, assessing the impact of
annual run restrictions on operating decisions.   On this point, the FERC staff has examined
outage data for a sample of units and concluded the outages they examined did not reflect
physical withholding.
Given the design of the California market, however, even the FERC may not be able to
determine from the dispatch data in all instances whether capacity was economically withheld in
order to exercise market power, or whether it was economically withheld because of mistaken
bids arising from imperfect foresight, which are an inevitable by product of the California market
design.
As described by proponents of the California market design:  “The ancillary services protocol
used in California is strongly dependent on bidders being able to select efficiently between day-
ahead energy, ancillary services and real-time markets in selling their scheduled capacity.  The
primary costs of offering ancillary services to the ISO under the protocol are opportunity costs
e.g., the profits foregone in other markets, such as selling into the PX, or offering capacity into
the real-time markets without being restricted to providing blocks of reserves.  To make efficient
ancillary services bids, then, sellers need to be able to gauge their opportunity costs as accurately
as possible.  Yet this is difficult or impossible given the limited data available.”
129  The result of
this market design is that ancillary services prices are probably higher than would be the case in
an efficient market, as are the costs of providing these services.  The obvious reality is that
California market participants have never had perfect foresight and never will.  Unless they do,
                                               
129  Seabron Adamson and Carl Imparato, “Fixing What is Broken:  What Steps Are Needed to Complete
California’s Power Markets?” October 20, 2000, pp. 4-5.69
however, the California market will continue to operate the way it does, and action to mitigate
market power may be less important than action to fix the faulty market design.
Ultimately, it is impossible to prove the absence of any withholding or any exercise of market
power without analyzing the reasons for every outage, derating, and decision not to operate by
every supplier, which has not been undertaken by any study.  The available information,
however, has several elements that suggest that the exercise of market power by California
thermal generators is not the primary cause of the high prices in California during 2000-2001.
First, electricity prices have been consistently high both inside and outside California, which
strongly suggests that the problem is not the exercise of locational market power inside
California but a widespread shortage of energy and/or capacity in the WSCC.  Indeed, prices
have at times been higher outside of California than within California due to transmission
constraints on exports.  Second, if thermal unit owners were engaged in a simple withholding of
generation, then they would not have exceeded the environmental limits on their output.  With
the benefit of hindsight, it appears indisputable that perfectly competitive thermal generator
owners of constrained units blessed with perfect foresight would have offered less capacity into
the market from a number of units in many hours during the spring and summer than they
actually did, not more capacity, and prices in such a perfectly competitive market would have
been higher, not lower, than the actual prices in many of the hours in early 2000.  Third, if the
high prices in California were attributable to simple withholding by a few thermal generators in
California, could these generators be exercising sufficient market power to raise prices off-peak
as well as on-peak throughout the entire WSCC?
While it is important that allegations of the exercise of market power be carefully investigated,
the evidence to date that the high prices in California and the WSCC arise mainly from the
exercise of market power by California thermal generators is far from compelling.  As Joskow
and Kahn have highlighted, many factors contributed to higher prices in California during 2000
and 2001, and the market power theme is only, at most, part of the story.  The import of their
analysis is not to prove that market power has been exercised but, rather, to suggest that it might
be important.  The import of the sensitivity analysis here is not to prove that market power has
not been exercised but, rather, to suggest that it is unlikely to be the dominant factor and may not
even be significant.  By contrast, there appears to be little disagreement that other problems of
shortage and bad market design are at least large enough to dictate that the solution requires
more than just market power mitigation devices.  Analysis of the possible exercise of market
power should not divert attention from the need for California to:
1.  Pay its bills;
2.  Raise retail rates, at least at the margin, to reflect the wholesale market price;
3.  Assign the financial responsibility for paying electricity bills to someone;
4.  Make it clear if and, if so, how, environmental regulations will be modified; and
5.  Adopt LMP and reform the wholesale market design.
Similarly, California should provide generators with incentives to contract for gas transportation
capacity (spurring the construction of more pipeline capacity), to make investments in emission
reductions, to make investments in improved heat rate performance and likely in additional
capacity.  None of these investments will be made if generators are uncertain of being paid for
the electricity they generate or are not permitted to earn a margin above the cost of fuel.70
Moreover, generators cannot buy fuel or pay for operations and maintenance if they are not paid
for their output.  It can be seen in Figure 24 that while the output of thermal generators in
California, reflected in the “other” category, has increased dramatically in the winter 2000-2001
relative to the winter of 1999-2000, there has been a corresponding large reduction in the output
of California “must-take” generation, as well as hydro and imports.  Identifying and reversing the
cause of this output reduction ought to be a high priority public policy objective.
Figure 24
Reproduced from Anjali Sheffrin, Market Analysis Report, March 30, 2001.
If the fall in “must-take” generation is largely due to a combination of QF purchase prices that
have failed to rise with gas prices and a failure to pay must-take generators for their output, then
the recent electricity shortages and accompanying high prices in California (and the WSCC
generally) would appear to be in considerable part a consequence of public policy decisions in
California.
Even more importantly, it is essential that retail customers be exposed to wholesale market prices
at the margin.  Despite the rhetoric about inelastic retail demand, San Diego customers71
responded to high prices last summer by reducing consumption.
130  This behavior indicates that
electricity is not worth the cost of production to at least some customers.  Retail customers in
California have been paying electricity prices that are often less than the cost of the fuel and
emission allowances required to generate that electricity.  This pricing subsidizes consumption
and may create distortions in interfuel consumption decisions.
Although the outcome of the current policy debates in California is uncertain, it is likely that one
way or another the customers in California will pay for the power that is consumed; however the
payment is being repackaged through asset transfers, bond financing with future surcharges, and
use of tax revenue.  Importantly, these steps do not protect the customers from the high prices;
they only hide and disguise the process of assigning the costs.
Hence, retail customers in California will eventually be asked to make up the difference between
the true cost of the electricity they are consuming and the current charges.  The current pricing
system in effect deprives retail customers of choice and ensures that many retail customers will
end up paying for electricity that they would not have consumed if they had the opportunity to
avoid these costs by reducing consumption.
Worse, if all loads are insulated from market prices in a shortage situation, the price change
required to clear the market will be more extreme, perhaps far more extreme, than if loads were
to reduce consumption in response to high prices, even if electricity costs were only passed
through on a monthly basis.  California’s effort to insulate electricity consumers from wholesale
market prices has aggravated the increase in wholesale market prices by eliminating the load
response that would be required to enable the wholesale market to clear at more moderate prices.
Moreover, the retail California electricity prices that are below the fuel cost of generating that
electricity create substantial risks of artificially increasing electricity demand on the transmission
grid by making it cheaper for customers to buy electricity from the grid than to burn gas or oil to
self-generate that electricity.
131
The most important step that can be taken to moderate electricity prices in the west is to begin
flowing wholesale prices through to California end users for their marginal consumption, rather
than continuing to subsidize consumption.
132   Moreover, it needs to be recognized that end-users
                                               
130  James Bushnell and Erin Mansur, “The Impact of Rate Deregulation on Electricity Consumption in San Diego,”
POWER Working Paper PWP-082, University of California Energy Institute, Berkeley, April, 2001.  “A
program of real-time applied to even half the customers in the ISO system, if it is credibly committed to and
property understood by customers, could produce power savings that allow California to avoid rolling
blackouts.” (p. 22).
131  The declining supply of energy from regulatory must-take resources since October 2000 may in part reflect this
effect.
132  Severin Borenstein, "The Trouble with Electricity Markets (and some solution)," POWER Working Paper,
PWP-081, University of California Energy Institute, Berkeley, January 2001.  Frank A. Wolak, "A Market
(Power) Mitigation Plan for the California Electricity Market," CAISO Market Surveillance Committee
Presentation, March 15, 2001.72
that reduce consumption and sell that electricity on the spot market are doing exactly what is
required to moderate prices in a shortage and should be praised, not criticized and punished.
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Less obviously, the California subsidies for end-user consumption cloud the investment outlook
for new electric generating capacity, because it is not clear to investors whether retail customers
are really willing to pay the cost of adding electric generating capacity to meet their load.  As
long as customers are paying subsidized prices for electricity, their consumption decisions
provide an uncertain guide for investment decisions.  Investment decisions that remove
consumer preferences from the decision-making process risk repeating the mistakes of the early
1980s when gas pipelines contracted for natural gas at prices that turned out to be higher than
consumers were willing to pay.
It is also important that responsibility for paying electricity bills be clearly assigned to someone
-- the end-user, the utility, or whoever -- so that those entities can enter into hedging contracts to
insulate themselves from price volatility to the degree that is appropriate.  This is also important
in avoiding the frequent outcome prior to deregulation in which regulators entered into hedging
contracts on behalf of customers at prices above what customers were willing to pay.
New investments in emission reduction are also important in reducing the cost of meeting
California electricity demand.  The incentives to make these investments will be reduced, and
some investments deferred, if it is unclear whether current environmental restrictions on
emissions will be relaxed.  If there will be some relaxation of emission limits, this should be
announced as soon as possible and if there will not be any relaxation, this also needs to be clearly
announced as soon as possible.  Delaying the decision will delay investments and prolong the
impact on market prices.  The economics of these investments also depend on the consumer
response to high prices, as the easiest way of reducing emissions from high emission plants is not
to run them because they are not needed.  The longer the delay in flowing through wholesale
prices into marginal retail prices the longer the likely delay in making environmental investments
as well.
Finally, the designed inefficiency of the California market has directly raised prices and also
greatly complicated diagnosis of the cause of the high prices.  The California ISO should shift
immediately to a bid-based least-cost dispatch in real-time and bid-based least-cost congestion
management in day-ahead markets.
134   Further, the FERC should recognize that directing the
CAISO to maintain minimum WSCC reserve levels at any cost has an important impact on the
cost of meeting load in a shortage situation.  Rather drive out high-cost supply, it would be better
                                               
133  See the discussion of Kaiser, MW Daily, December 13, 2000, p. 7.
134  California Independent System Operator, "Proposed Market Stabilization Plan of the California Independent
System Operator Corporation Provided in Response to Letter Order of March 30, 2001," Submission to Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission, April 6, 2001.  This plan includes some of the suggested reforms, but also
introduces other features such as price discrimination between various sources of supply that would likely
complicate market operations.73
public policy to recognize that every MW of the 3,000 or so MW of regulation and reserves that
the CAISO seeks to schedule is not worth $1,000, $750, $500 or $250/MW.
135
                                               
135  This issue is discussed further in Harvey-Hogan, pp. 25-26.  See also John D. Chandley, Scott M. Harvey,
William W. Hogan., “Electricity Market Reform in California,” Comments in FERC Docket EL00-95-000,
Center for Business and Government, Harvard University, November 22, 2000.74
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